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On Vindicating Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Wesley C. Salmon*
Affiliation:
Indiana University

Abstract

This paper deals with the problem of vindicating a particular type of inductive rule, a rule to govern inferences from observed frequencies to limits of relative frequencies. Reichenbach's rule of induction is defended. By application of two conditions, normalizing conditions and a criterion of linguistic invariance, it is argued that alternative rules lead to contradiction. It is then argued that the rule of induction does not lead to contradiction when suitable restrictions are placed upon the predicates admitted. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox is considered, and an attempt to resolve it is offered. Finally, Reichenbach's pragmatic argument, hinging on convergence properties, is applied.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1963

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Footnotes

∗∗

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Induction held at the Wesleyan Center for Advanced Studies in June, 1961. It is published here by agreement with the Wesleyan University Press.

References

[1] Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955).Google Scholar
[2] Goodman, Nelson, “Positionality andPicturesPhilosophical Review, LXIX, 4 (October 1960).Google Scholar
[3] Reichenbach, The Theory of Probability (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949).Google Scholar
[4] Salmon, Wesley, “The Predictive Inference”, Philosophy of Science, XXIV, 2 (April, 1957).Google Scholar