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On Vindicating Induction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of vindicating a particular type of inductive rule, a rule to govern inferences from observed frequencies to limits of relative frequencies. Reichenbach's rule of induction is defended. By application of two conditions, normalizing conditions and a criterion of linguistic invariance, it is argued that alternative rules lead to contradiction. It is then argued that the rule of induction does not lead to contradiction when suitable restrictions are placed upon the predicates admitted. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox is considered, and an attempt to resolve it is offered. Finally, Reichenbach's pragmatic argument, hinging on convergence properties, is applied.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1963
Footnotes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Induction held at the Wesleyan Center for Advanced Studies in June, 1961. It is published here by agreement with the Wesleyan University Press.
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