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On the Alleged Backwards Referral of Experiences and Its Relevance to the Mind-Body Problem
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neurophysiological explanation is most likely.
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- Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
An earlier version of this paper was read at a symposium with Benjamin Libet and Howard Shevrin at the annual meetings of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology held at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in March 1980. I am especially indebted to Jennifer Clinch and Larry Jordan for generous help and advice, and also to Stephen Stich and Daniel Dennett for asking me to look into Libet's work for the SPP meetings. This research was supported by Grant 451-790466 of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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