Hostname: page-component-669899f699-ggqkh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-29T11:54:05.268Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Normative Naturalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Larry Laudan
Larry Laudan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Hawaii at Manoa
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Normative naturalism is a view about the status of epistemology and philosophy of science; it is a meta-epistemology. It maintains that epistemology can both discharge its traditional normative role and nonetheless claim a sensitivity to empirical evidence. The first sections of this essay set out the central tenets of normative naturalism, both in its epistemic and its axiological dimensions; later sections respond to criticisms of that species of naturalism from Gerald Doppelt, Jarrett Leplin and Alex Rosenberg.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 44 - 59
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Donovan, A., Laudan, R., and Laudan, L. (1988) (eds.), Scrutinizing Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer.10.1007/978-94-009-2855-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Doppelt, G. (1986), “Relativism and the Reticulational Model of Scientific Rationality”, Synthese 69: 225–252.10.1007/BF00413982CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (1977), Progress and Its Problems. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1984), Science and Values, Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1987a), “Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism”, American Philosophical Quarterly 24: 19–31.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1987b), “Relativism, Naturalism and Reticulation”, Synthese 71: 221–234.10.1007/BF00485630CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (1989a), “The Rational Weight of the Scientific Past: Forging Fundamental Change in a Conservative Discipline”, in M. Ruse (ed.), What the Philosophy of Biology Is. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1989b), “If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40: 369–375.10.1093/bjps/40.3.369CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. et al. (1986), “Testing Theories of Scientific Change”, Synthese 69: 141–224.10.1007/BF00413981CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Worrall, J. (1988), “The Value of a Fixed Methodology”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39: 263–275.10.1093/bjps/39.2.263CrossRefGoogle Scholar