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The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

G. H. Merrill
G. H. Merrill*
Affiliation:
Loyola University of Chicago
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Abstract

In “Realism and Reason” Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the “intended” interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any “intended” interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can be shown that realism is immune to Putnam's criticism and that attempts at reformulating this criticism are not likely to meet with success.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 1980 , pp. 69 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1980

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