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Michael Faraday's “Historical Sketch of Electro-Magnetism” and the Theory-Dependence of Experimentation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Aaron D. Cobb
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Abstract

This article explores Michael Faraday's “Historical Sketch of Electro-Magnetism” as a fruitful source for understanding the epistemic significance of experimentation. In this work Faraday provides a catalog of the numerous experimental and theoretical developments in the early history of electromagnetism. He also describes methods that enable experimentalists to dissociate experimental results from the theoretical commitments generating their research. An analysis of the methods articulated in this sketch is instructive for confronting epistemological worries about the theory-dependence of experimentation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 5 , December 2009 , pp. 624 - 636
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful to Kent Staley, William Rehg, and Scott Crothers for their help in improving an earlier draft of this article.

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