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Mathematics, Science, and Confirmation Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Christopher Pincock
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Abstract

This article begins by distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic contributions of mathematics to scientific representation. This leads to two investigations into how these different sorts of contributions relate to confirmation. I present a way of accommodating both contributions that complicates the traditional assumptions of confirmation theory. In particular, I argue that subjective Bayesianism does best in accounting for extrinsic contributions, while objective Bayesianism is more promising for intrinsic contributions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 5 , December 2010 , pp. 959 - 970
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

An earlier version of this article was given in a symposium with Robert Batterman, Stathis Psillos, and Mark Wilson. I would like to thank them for a productive session, as well as for their help with this project. Comments from the audience, Paul Draper, James Hawthorne, Jonah Schupbach, and two anonymous referees were also very useful in revising this article.

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