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Levels of Reasons and Causal Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Bradford Skow
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Abstract

I defend the theory that the reasons why some event occurred are its causes. Many “counterexamples” to this theory turn on confusing two levels of reasons. We should distinguish the reasons why an event occurred (“first-level reasons”) from the reasons why those reasons are reasons (“second-level reasons”). An example that treats a second-level reason as a first-level reason will look like a counterexample if that second-level reason is not a cause. But second-level reasons need not be first-level reasons.

Type
Explanation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 5 , December 2017 , pp. 905 - 915
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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