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Invariance, Interpretation, and Motivation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Thomas Møller-Nielsen
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Abstract

In this article I assess the Invariance Principle, which states that only quantities that are invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real. I argue, contrary to current orthodoxy, that the variance of a quantity under a theory’s symmetries is not a sufficient basis for interpreting that theory as being uncommitted to the reality of that quantity. Rather, I argue, the variance of a quantity under symmetries only ever serves as a motivation to refrain from any commitment to the quantity in question.

Type
Physical Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 5 , December 2017 , pp. 1253 - 1264
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For extremely helpful comments and discussion, I would like to thank David Baker, Neil Dewar, James Ladyman, Niels Martens, Tushar Menon, Oliver Pooley, James Read, Simon Saunders, Alex Skinner, Teru Thomas, David Wallace, and audiences in London, Cardiff, and Atlanta.

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