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Inferences from Phenomena in Gravitational Physics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

William Harper  and
Robert Disalle
William Harper
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
Robert Disalle
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
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Abstract

Newton's methodology emphasized propositions “inferred from phenomena.” These rest on systematic dependencies that make phenomena measure theoretical parameters. We consider the inferences supporting Newton's inductive argument that gravitation is proportional to inertial mass. We argue that the support provided by these systematic dependencies is much stronger than that provided by bootstrap confirmation; this kind of support thus avoids some of the major objections against bootstrapping. Finally we examine how contemporary testing of equivalence principles exemplifies this Newtonian methodological theme.

Type
Space-time Issues
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S46 - S54
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

This paper has benefitted from useful criticism of an earlier draft by Alan Hajek, Peter Vanderschraaf, and James Woodward.

‡

Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario Canada N6A 3K7.

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