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Idealization and Many Aims

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Angela Potochnik
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Abstract

In this article, I first outline the view developed in my recent book on the role of idealization in scientific understanding. I discuss how this view leads to the recognition of a number of kinds of variability among scientific representations, including variability introduced by the many different aims of scientific projects. I then argue that the role of idealization in securing understanding distances understanding from truth but that this understanding nonetheless gives rise to scientific knowledge. This discussion will clarify how my view relates to three other recent books on understanding by Henk de Regt, Catherine Elgin, and Kareem Khalifa.

Type
Understanding and Imagination
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 5: PSA 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II Symposia Papers , December 2020 , pp. 933 - 943
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I owe thanks to my cosymposiasts Catherine Elgin, Kareem Khalifa, and Henk de Regt for a lively and genial exchange. Kareem Khalifa also provided helpful comments on a draft of this article.

References

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