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Holism without Tears: Local and Global Effects in Cognitive Processes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ron McClamrock
Ron McClamrock*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Chicago
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Abstract

The suggestion that cognition is holistic has become a prominent criticism of optimism about the prospects for cognitive science. This paper argues that the standard motivation for this holism, that of epistemological holism, does not justify this pessimism. An illustration is given of how the effects of epistemological holism on perception are compatible with the view that perceptual processes are highly modular. A suggestion for generalizing this idea to conceptual cognitive processing is made, and an account of the holists' failure is offered.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 2 , June 1989 , pp. 258 - 274
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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