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Glymour on Confirmation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
Glymour has developed an account of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses which he advocates as an alternative to the hypothetico-deductive and Bayesian accounts. This account is subject to a counter-example which may be accomodated by a slight modification. So modified it describes an important dimension of confirmation. If the modification of Glymour's account is slightly extended, both the resulting account and the hypothetico-deductive account may be seen as special cases of a Bayesian theory which is immune to Glymour's criticisms.
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- Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
Research for this paper was supported in part by the National Science Foundation.
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