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For Pluralism and Against Realism About Species

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

P. Kyle Stanford
P. Kyle Stanford*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego
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Abstract

I argue for accepting a pluralist approach to species, while rejecting the realism about species espoused by P. Kitcher and a number of other philosophers of biology. I develop an alternative view of species concepts as divisions of organisms into groups for study which are relative to the systematic explanatory interests of biologists at a particular time. I also show how this conception resolves a number of difficult puzzles which plague the application of particular species concepts.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 70 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Bruce Glymour, Josh Kohn, Aarre Laakso, Alyssa McIntyre, Martin Rudwick, and especially Philip Kitcher for helpful comments, suggestions and guidance. This paper was considerably improved by the comments of an anonymous referee for Philosophy of Science. The errors are, of course, my own.

This material is based upon work supported under a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author; Department of Philosophy; 3103 Galbraith Hall, 0302; University of California at San Diego; La Jolla, CA 92093-0302; USA.

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