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Fodor's Theory of Content: Problems and Objections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

William Seager
William Seager*
Affiliation:
Division of Humanities, University of Toronto, Scarborough Campus
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Abstract

Jerry Fodor has recently proposed a new entry into the list of information based approaches to semantic content aimed at explicating the general notion of representation for both mental states and linguistic tokens. The basic idea is that a token means what causes its production. The burden of the theory is to select the proper cause from the sea of causal influences which aid in generating any token while at the same time avoiding the absurdity of everything's being literally meaningful (since everything has a cause). I argue that a detailed examination of the theory reveals that neither burden can be successfully shouldered.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 262 - 277
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

Send reprint requests to the author, Division of Humanities, University of Toronto, Scarborough Campus, 1265 Military Trail, Scarborough, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada.

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