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The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael A. Bishop  and
Stephen P. Stich
Michael A. Bishop*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Iowa State University
Stephen P. Stich*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University
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Abstract

The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that without a defense of this step, the flight to reference is a fatally flawed strategy; it cannot succeed in resolving philosophical issues. In this paper we begin by setting out the flight to reference strategy and explaining what is wrong with arguments that invoke the strategy. We then illustrate the problem by considering arguments for and against eliminative materialism. In the final section we argue that much the same problem undermines Philip Kitcher's attempt to defend scientific realism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 65 , Issue 1 , March 1998 , pp. 33 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1998

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to S. Stich, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 26 Nichol Ave., New Brunswick, NJ 08901–2882; e-mail: [email protected]

‡

Earlier versions of the arguments developed in this paper were presented to the philosophy of science discussion group at Canterbury University in Christchurch, New Zealand, the Beijing Forum for Philosophy of Science at the Institute of Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Philosophy Colloquium at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and at conferences at the University of Utah and Humboldt University in Berlin. We are grateful to all of these audiences for much valuable feedback. Special thanks are due to Philip Catton, Steve Downes, Hartry Field, Heimir Geirsson, Philip Kitcher and an anonymous referee for Philosophy of Science.

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