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Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Timothy D. Lyons
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Abstract

Scientific realists have claimed that the posit that our theories are (approximately) true provides the best or the only explanation for their success. In response, I revive two nonrealist explanations. I show that realists, in discarding them, have either misconstrued the phenomena to be explained or mischaracterized the relationship between these explanations and their own. I contend nonetheless that these nonrealist competitors, as well as their realist counterparts, should be rejected; for none of them succeed in explaining a significant list of successes. I propose a related nonrealist explanation of success that appears to be the most suitable among those considered.

Type
Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 891 - 901
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

For discussions on various issues addressed here, I am indebted to Howard Sankey, Neil Thomason, Brian Ellis, Stephen Ames, John Worrall, Peter Lipton, and David Papineau.

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