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Evolvability, Dispositions, and Intrinsicality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
In this paper I examine a dispositional property that has been receiving increased attention in biology, evolvability. First, I identify three compatible but distinct investigative approaches, distinguish two interpretations of evolvability, and treat the difference between dispositions of individuals versus populations. Second, I explore the relevance of philosophical distinctions about dispositions for evolvability, isolating the assumption that dispositions are intrinsically located. I conclude that some instances of evolvability cannot be understood as purely intrinsic to populations and suggest alternative strategies for resolving this difficulty.
- Type
- Genes, Development, and Evolution
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1015 - 1027
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
Jim Bogen, Ingo Brigandt, Paul Griffiths, Jim Lennox, Sandy Mitchell, and Günter Wagner provided helpful criticism and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the participants of the first annual conference on Recent Work in Biology and Philosophy at Duke University in June 2002, where a version of this paper was presented, and those attending the “Genes, Development, and Evolution” session at PSA for useful comments. Special thanks to Butch Brodie for directing me to the literature on coevolution.
References
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