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The Entropy Theory of Counterfactuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Douglas N. Kutach
Douglas N. Kutach*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73073 [email protected].
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Abstract

I assess the thesis that counterfactual asymmetries are explained by an asymmetry of the global entropy at the temporal boundaries of the universe, by developing a method of evaluating counterfactuals that includes, as a background assumption, the low entropy of the early universe. The resulting theory attempts to vindicate the common practice of holding the past mostly fixed under counterfactual supposition while at the same time allowing the counterfactual's antecedent to obtain by a natural physical development. Although the theory has some success in evaluating a wide variety of ordinary counterfactuals, it fails as an explanation of counterfactual asymmetry.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue 1 , March 2002 , pp. 82 - 104
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Credit for assistance in the development of this paper goes to Tim Maudlin, David Albert, and Frank Arntzenius.

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