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Duhem's Thesis, Observationality, and Justification
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extract
Adolf Grünbaum, [1], and Philip Quinn, [7], have proposed two problems as sharpened versions of theses suggested by Pierre Duhem. (1) Can an hypothesis which in itself has no observational consequences ever be falsified by the evidence ? (2) When a theory has observational consequences only in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses and some of these consequences fail, can the theory always be reasonably defended by constructing alternative auxiliary hypotheses ?
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- Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association
References
Grünbaum, A. “Can We Ascertain the Falsity of a Scientific Hypothesis?” In Observation and Theory in Science. Edited by Mandelbaum, M. and Barker, S. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.Google Scholar
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