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Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael Strevens
Michael Strevens*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Stanford University
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Abstract

It is widely thought that the size of a probability makes no difference to the quality of a probabilistic explanation. I argue that explanatory practice in statistical physics, past and present, belies this claim. The claim has gained currency only because of an impoverished conception of the nature of probabilistic processes and an unwarranted assumption that all probabilistic explanations have a single form.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue 3 , September 2000 , pp. 366 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Stanford University, Philosophy Department, Building 90, Stanford, CA 94305–2155.

‡

Thanks to Anthony Everett, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Christopher Hitchcock for helpful comments.

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