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Discussion: The Total Evidence Theorem for Probability Kinematics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Paul R. Graves
Paul R. Graves*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of California, Irvine
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Abstract

L. J. Savage and I. J. Good have each demonstrated that the expected utility of free information is never negative for a decision maker who updates her degrees of belief by conditionalization on propositions learned for certain. In this paper Good's argument is generalized to show the same result for a decision maker who updates her degrees of belief on the basis of uncertain information by Richard Jeffrey's probability kinematics. The Savage/Good result is shown to be a special case of the more general result.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 2 , June 1989 , pp. 317 - 324
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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