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Discussion: Axiomatics and Individuality: A Reply to Williams' “Species are Individuals”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Marc Ereshefsky
Marc Ereshefsky*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Abstract

In her “Species Are Individuals” (1985), Mary Williams offers informal arguments and a sketched proof which allegedly show that species are individuals with respect to evolutionary theory. In this paper, I suggest that her informal arguments are insufficient for showing that clans are not sets and that species are individuals. I also argue that her sketched proof depends on three questionable assumptions.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 55 , Issue 3 , September 1988 , pp. 427 - 434
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author wishes to thank Elliott Sober for his help and encouragement, and Mary B. Williams for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

References

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