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Discussion: A Defense of Bechtel and Mundale∗

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Mark B. Couch
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Abstract

Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 198 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Philip Kitcher and two anonymous referees for help with this paper.

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