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A Difficulty for Testing the Inner Sense Theory of Introspection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michael Roche
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Abstract

A common way of testing the inner sense theory of introspection exploits the possibility of damage to inner sense. Such damage is expected to lead to first-personal deficits/impairments of one kind or another. I raise various problems for this way of testing the theory. The main difficulty, I argue, stems from the existence of the method subserving confabulation.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 1019 - 1030
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

In writing this article, I have benefitted greatly from discussions with Sarah Paul, Lawrence Shapiro, and Danielle Wylie. Thanks also to the audiences at the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology (2011), the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2011), and especially the Philosophy of Science Association (2012), where I presented various versions of this article. In each case, the ensuing discussion was very helpful.

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