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Definition and Reduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Edward H. Madden
Edward H. Madden*
Affiliation:
San Jose State College
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Abstract

While I do not accept any current analysis of theoretical terms I also reject certain criticisms of them. Specifically, I reject the criticism that the paradoxes of material implication and the counterfactual problem eliminate the explicit definition view; and I also reject the criticism that explicitly defined theoretical terms do not refer to anything which “really exists” or do not have “excess meaning.” I do argue, however, that the explicit definition view confuses and conflates the concepts of criterion and meaning analysis. I also defend reduction sentences against the counterfactual difficulty, but show, too, how this view is already logically committed to the network or postulational view of meaning. Finally, I show how the concept of reduction sentences confuses in several ways the concepts of criterion and meaning analysis—although not in quite the same way as explicit definitions do.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , October 1961 , pp. 390 - 405
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1961

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