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Critical Review: Sober's Philosophy of Biology and his Philosophy of Biology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Alex Rosenberg
Alex Rosenberg*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosphy, University of Georgia
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Abstract

An examination of the foundations of Elliot Sober's philosophy of biology as reflected in his introductory textbook of that title reveals substantial and controversial philosphical commitments. Among these are the claim that all understanding is historical, the assertion that there are biological laws but they are necessary truths, the view that the fundamental theory in biology is a narrative, and the suggestion that biology adverts to ungrounded probablistic propensities of the sort to be met with elsewhere only in quantum mechanics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 452 - 464
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

The author wishes to thank Elliot Sober, Philip Kitcher and two anonymous referees for comments and criticisms on a previous draft, two anonymous referees for other improvements, and Balliol College, Oxford for hospitality during the period he worked on this paper.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Academic Building, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-6112.

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