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Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Andre Kukla
Andre Kukla*
Affiliation:
Division of Life Sciences University of Toronto
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Division of Life Sciences, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, Scarborough, Ontario MIC 1A4, CANADA.
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Abstract

Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , September 1991 , pp. 486 - 490
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Preparation of this article was supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Committee of the University of Toronto.

References

Garber, D. (1983), “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, in J. Earman (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 10, Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 99–131.Google Scholar
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Kukla, A. (1990), “Evolving Probability”, Philosophical Studies 59: 213–224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar