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Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michael Silberstein  and
Anthony Chemero
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Abstract

Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to either stretch to now include explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail or acknowledge that there are counterexamples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 958 - 970
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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