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Confirmation and Adequacy Conditions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Marsha Hanen
Marsha Hanen*
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Extract

Several standard conditions of adequacy for confirmation are considered and a conclusion of B. Skyrms regarding the converse-consequence condition is shown to be mistaken. Widely accepted conditions such as the entailment condition and the special consequence condition are shown to be open to counterexample, and confusion about these conditions is traced to confusion about the difference between two kinds of confirmation concepts—concepts of firmness and concepts of increase in firmness. The importance of concepts of the latter sort is stressed. Finally, some suggestions are offered relating to the notion of selective confirmation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , September 1971 , pp. 361 - 368
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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