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Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate.
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- Copyright © 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I am grateful for helpful comments from Richard Feldman, Teddy Seidenfeld, and William Harper.
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