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Bayesianism and the Value of Diverse Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Daniel Steel
Daniel Steel*
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
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Abstract

In a recent essay (1995), Andrew Wayne charges that Bayesian attempts to account for the rule that, ceteris paribus, diverse evidence confirms better than narrow evidence are inadequate. I reply to these criticisms and argue that, on the contrary, one of the Bayesian approaches considered by Wayne does an excellent job of explaining why, and under what circumstances, diverse evidence is valuable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 666 - 674
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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References

Earman, J. (1992), Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Horwich, P. (1982), Probability and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Howson, C. and Urbach, P., (1989), Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Wayne, A. (1995), “Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence”, Philosophy of Science 62: 111–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar