Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
The intuitive notion of a statistical explanation has been explicated in different ways; recently it has even been claimed that there are no statistical explanations at all. In an attempt to clarify the disputed issue, the approaches adopted by Hempel, by Jeffrey, Salmon and Greeno, and by Stegmüller are analyzed critically, as far as they are concerned with the explanation of particular events. A solution of the controversy is proposed on the basis of a concept of explanation which refers essentially to a causal analysis of the explanandum. The possibility of statistical explanations, then, becomes contingent upon the existence of indeterministic causation. In conclusion, therefore, a conception of causality is sketched which shows that indeterminism and causal connection are compatible, at least from an epistemological point of view, so that statistical explanation can be seen to represent a specific and possibly irreducible scientific activity.
This article was originally stimulated by Professor C. G. Hempel; an early version of this paper was read in his seminar. I am grateful to him for several discussions and many valuable suggestions which helped to improve upon preliminary drafts of this paper. Discussions in the philosophy colloquia of Columbia University and the University of Waterloo helped me to see some of its aspects, including critical points, more clearly.