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Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplin’s contention that neither van Fraassen’s Darwinist explanation nor Laudan’s methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fine’s suggestion— that the empirical adequacy of our theories already explains their success—is more promising for antirealists. Leplin claims that this putative explanation collapses into realism on one reading and into vacuity on another reading. But his analysis conflates three doctrines into two, and one of the three avoids both realism and vacuity.
- Type
- Realism and Anti-Realism
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996
Footnotes
This material was developed during correspondence with Jarrett Leplin, whose input I gratefully acknowledge. This work was supported by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Division of Life Sciences, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, Scarborough, Ontario MIC 1A4.
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