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An Unnoticed Flaw in Barker and Achinstein's Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Edward S. Shirley*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Louisiana State University

Abstract

Barker and Achinstein misread Goodman's definitions of ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’. If we stick to Goodman's definition of ‘grue’ as applying “to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue” (my italics), and his parallel definition of ‘bleen’, then Barker and Achinstein's arguments are seen to be irrelevant. The result is to by-pass the question whether Mr. Grue sees things as grue rather than as green while showing that it is possible for human conceptual schemes to employ different sensory terms. These two issues are separate.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

Barker and Achinstein (1960), “On the New Riddle of Induction” in The Philosophical Review, vol. 69, no. 4: pp. 511522.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodman, Nelson (1955), Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Goodman, Nelson (1972A), “Seven Strictures on Similarity” in Problems and Projects. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill; pp. 437–46.Google Scholar
Goodman, Nelson (1972B) “Positionality and Pictures” in Problems and Projects. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill; pp. 402–3.Google Scholar