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An Economist's Glance at Goldman's Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Esther-Mirjam Sent
Esther-Mirjam Sent*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame
*
†Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, e-mail: [email protected].
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Abstract

Goldman joins the ranks of epistemologists, philosophers, and science studies scholars trying to use economic models of science. For Goldman, these models are part of social rather than individual epistemics. His hope is that these models will illustrate that non-epistemic goals of individual scientists such as professional success do not necessarily undermine epistemic aims of science such as the acquisition of truth. This paper shows that there are inconsistencies between Goldman's individual and social epistemics, that these models do not live up to Goldman's standards of evaluation, and that the economic models that Goldman uses are not social.

Type
Symposium: The Use of Economic Concepts in Contemporary Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue S4: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Dec., 1997 , 1997 , pp. S139 - S148
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

The author gratefully acknowledges support from a grant by the University of Notre Dame Faculty Research Program.

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