Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-8ctnn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T10:11:04.594Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Amplifying Personal Probability Theory: Comments on L. J. Savage's “Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Abner Shimony
Abner Shimony*
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Professor Savage has been candid and generous in stating his interest in philosophy, and the philosophers who have heard him are surely grateful for this. His attitude is very far from that of some competent scientists and mathematicans who purport to clear up the questions which philosophers raise concerning their disciplines by means of a battery of technical results of varying relevance—a procedure which can often be appropriately described as “an abominable snow-job.” However, Professor Savage's generosity places a responsibility on philosophers, since the questions he raises are difficult.

Type
A Panel Discussion of Personal Probability
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , December 1967 , pp. 326 - 332
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

[1] Aczél, J., Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications (New York: Academic Press, 1966), pp. 319–24.Google Scholar
[2] Cox, Richard, The Algebra of Probable Inference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961).Google Scholar
[3] Cox, Richard, “Probability, Frequency, and Reasonable Expectation,” American Journal of Physics, vol. 14, pp. 1–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] DeFinetti, Bruno, “La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives,” Annales de l'institut Henri Poincaré, vol. 7, pp. 7–14. Reprinted in [12].Google Scholar
[5] Duhem, Pierre, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6] Edwards, W., et al., “Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research,” Psychological Review, vol. 70, p. 211.Google Scholar
[7] Flavell, J. H., The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[8] Good, I. J., Probability and the Weighing of Evidence (London: C. Griffin, 1950), pp. 105–06.Google Scholar
[9] Inhelder, B., et al., The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence (New York: Basic Books, 1958).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[10] Jeffrey, Richard, The Logic of Decision (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), especially pp. 146–152.Google Scholar
[11] Jeffreys, Harold, Theory of Probability, 3rd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).Google Scholar
[12] Kyburg, H., et al., Studies in Subjective Probability (New York: Wiley, 1964).Google Scholar
[13] Peirce, C. S., Collected Papers, eds. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, vol. II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), paragraphs 220 and 654, and elsewhere.Google Scholar
[14] Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Science Editions, 1961), pp. 363–73.Google Scholar
[15] Quine, W. V., “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review, vol. 60, pp. 20–43. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).Google Scholar
[16] Ramsey, Frank, “Truth and Probability,” in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), p. 182 Reprinted in [12].Google Scholar