Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2019
The dominant interpretation of the Glorious Revolution portrays it as an innovative compromise that used clever institutional design to solve a coordination problem between rival elites. In contrast, I argue that it was neither innovative nor a compromise and that it was the product of structural change rather than institutional design. Following Barrington Moore, I focus on the rise of agrarian capitalism and economically autonomous elites, who, in contrast to rent-seeking elites, do not depend on favor from the state for their income. They have an interest in the creation of a political system that ensures their equal rights under the law, open access to markets, and opportunities to form broad coalitions against rent-seeking. This makes them a critical constituency for representative government. I test this argument through an analysis of patterns of allegiance for Crown and Parliament at the outset of the English Civil War and address its relevance to the Glorious Revolution.
The author is grateful to Bill Bulman, Jeffry Frieden, Arman Grigoryan, Erin Hern, Seo-Hyun Park, Gang Wang, the participants in the “Political Economy of Regime Transitions” workshop at Lehigh University, and anonymous reviewers for their comments and advice.