The Healing of Nations: The Promise and Limits of Political Forgiveness. By Mark R. Amstutz. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, 296p. $79.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.

International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction. By Richard Caplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 304p. $99.00 cloth.

In the late 1990s, the World Bank conducted a far-reaching research program on the causes of civil war. Were civil wars inspired mainly by genuine unresolved political grievances, or were they precipitated by predatory groups (including governments) seeking to profit monetarily from violence and instability? Among the bank's myriad findings, many of them hotly disputed, came one assertion around which there was almost universal consensus: that the single factor that made future conflict likely was past conflict concluded within the previous five years. This finding, based on exhaustive empirical research, has two profound consequences for thinkers and practitioners engaged in formulating and assessing the transition from war to peace. On the one hand, it shows that the risks and costs of failure are high. Failure to foster political reconciliation, to tackle the root causes of conflict, to rebuild shattered economies and (among other things) provide a secure environment is more likely to lead to the outbreak of war and oppression than any other factor. On the other hand, the World Bank findings show that—contra some skeptics who argue that third parties have no part to play and that political conflicts are best resolved violently—long-term success need not be a chimera: Build peace effectively for over five years and the chances of future conflict decrease dramatically. There are clear lessons for Iraq here—civil war need not be inevitable, but to avoid it requires getting a wide variety of things right that are currently going wrong.