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Who Passes Business’s “Model Bills”? Policy Capacity and Corporate Influence in U.S. State Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2014

Alexander Hertel-Fernandez
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Abstract

Which policymakers are most likely to enact legislation drafted by organized business interests? Departing from the business power scholarship that emphasizes structural, electoral, or financial mechanisms for corporate influence, I argue that lawmakers are likely to rely on businesses' proposals when they lack the time and resources to develop legislation on their own, especially when they also hold an ideological affinity for business. Using two new datasets of “model bills” developed by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a policy group that promotes pro-business legislation across the states, I find strong support for this theory. These results indicate that ALEC provides private policy capacity to state legislators who would otherwise lack such support, and relatedly, that low state policy capacity may favor certain organized interests over others—namely the business interests affiliated with ALEC. My findings have implications for the study of business influence in policymaking, as well as for state politics.

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Articles
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 582 - 602
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2014 

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