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Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2005

Helen V. Milner
Helen V. Milner
Affiliation:
Princeton University ([email protected])
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At the conclusion of World War II, several international institutions were created to manage the world economy and prevent another Great Depression. These institutions include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now called the World Bank), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was expanded and institutionalized into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. These institutions have not only persisted for over five decades, but they have also expanded their mandates, changed their missions, and increased their membership. They have, however, become highly contested. As Stiglitz notes, “International bureaucrats—the faceless symbols of the world economic order—are under attack everywhere…. Virtually every major meeting of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization is now the scene of conflict and turmoil.”Helen V. Milner is the B. C. Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and the director of the Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School ([email protected]). She has written extensively on issues related to international trade, the connections between domestic politics and foreign policy, globalization and regionalism, and the relationship between democracy and trade policy. Her writings include Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (1997), Internationalization and Domestic Politics (co-edited with Robert O. Keohane, 1996), “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries” (International Organization 2005), “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape” (coauthored with B. Peter Rosendorff, International Organization, 2001). The author thanks David Baldwin, Chuck Beitz, Robert O. Keohane, Erica Gould, Steve Macedo, Lisa Martin, Thomas Pogge, Tom Romer, and Jim Vreeland for invaluable comments. She also received much useful advice from seminars at Princeton University and the Rockefeller Foundation's Bellagio Study and Conference Center.

Type
REVIEW ESSAY
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 3 , Issue 4 , December 2005 , pp. 833 - 854
Copyright
© 2005 American Political Science Association

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