Populism is an abiding force in global politics and in recent decades has been ever more paramount, especially in the Andean nations. At the same time, scholarly debates about populism—about the definition of the concept, about the reasons for its strength, and about its implications—continue. Both Julio Carrión’s and Jennifer Collins’s books are major contributions to our understanding of populism in the Andes in the twenty-first century.

There are important similarities between the two books. Both Carrión and Collins wrestle with the scholarly literature about populism and rigorously present their definitions of the concept. Both have carried out years of field research in the countries that they analyze and are deeply knowledgeable about them. Both bring a comparative-historical approach to their books; Carrión traces the trajectory of the recent populist regimes in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela while Collins traces it in Bolivia and Ecuador. Both focus first on the emergence of opposition to the governments of the 1980s and 1990s, second on the rise of the populist leader, next on the pivotal juncture of confrontation between the populist leader and the opposition, and ultimately on the continuation or constraint of the populist government. The overriding concern of both scholars is the implications of the populist regime for the countries’ future well-being.

However, there is a major difference in the overall perspective of the two books. For Carrión, the Andean populist regimes are primarily destructive whereas, for Collins, they are primarily constructive. Carrión emphasizes that the populist leaders seek to void constitutional checks and balances (in particular term limits) and, ultimately, diminish democracy; Collins emphasizes that the populist leaders are building on the demands of social movements to redress injustice and exclusion.

In part, the two scholars’ different perspectives reflect different definitions of populism. Following the most recent scholarship, Carrión defines the term as exclusively political; populism is “a political strategy for seeking and exercising power …. [It] embraces a confrontational mentality … [and] is meant to subvert the political status quo” (p. 13, emphasis in the original). By contrast, returning to common definitions of populism in the twentieth century, Collins incorporates into her definition of “radical populism” the political, social, and economic inclusion of previously marginalized sectors of the population into a country’s democracy (pp. 4–9).

In accord with these different definitions, Carrión and Collins advance different explanations for the antecedents of populism in the Andean countries in recent decades. For Carrión, the antecedents are relatively short-term political problems; he highlights “mass political discontent and elite disarray” in the decade or so before the election of the populist president. Carrión states that “[a] case can be made that these two critical conditions or antecedents have deeper historical roots or manifest structural deficiencies, but it is not my intention to trace back such processes” (p. 53). By contrast, Collins emphasizes that “[l]eft-wing populism in the central Andes was a response to histories of social injustice and the intensification of popular exclusion under neoliberalism” (p. 267).

While both Carrión and Collins strive to identify the pivotal moments of confrontation between the populist leader and the opposition and they concur that, in Bolivia and Ecuador, these moments were the countries’ constituent assemblies, their evaluations of this moment are different. Consider, for example, that the title of Carrión’s chapter assessing this moment is “The Hobbesian Moment” but the title of Collins’s chapter is “Battling to Refound the Nation: Constituent Assemblies as Moments of National Transformation.” (In Carrión’s volume, the key “Hobbesian moment” in Peru is Alberto Fujimori’s closing of the Congress in 1991–92; in Venezuela, it is Hugo Chávez’s survival of a coup and a national strike and victory in a recall election in 2001–4; and, in Colombia, it is Álvaro Uribe’s failure to achieve a constitutional provision for a third consecutive term in 2008–10.)

For Carrión, the key question is how populism can be “constrained.” For him, among the five countries analyzed in his book, Colombia is the most positive case, where Uribe’s ambitions were checked by Colombia’s strong independent institutions; Venezuela is the most negative case, where Chávez established “dominant-authoritarian populism.” Bolivia is also a negative case, where President Evo Morales’s ambitions were not checked and populism became “dominant-hegemonic,” while populism in Peru under Fujimori and Ecuador under Rafael Correa was “contested” and not as negative (p. 48).

By contrast, for Collins, the key question is the relationship between the country’s populist leader and its social movements. Throughout, Collins contrasts Morales as a “figure … of [Bolivia’s] social movements” and Correa as “someone without organic ties to the movements” (p. 116). Collins argues convincingly that Morales’s close cooperation with Bolivia’s social movements is the most important reason for the enduring strength of his political party in Bolivia, whereas Correa’s increasing marginalization of Ecuador’s social movements is the most important reason for the weakening of his political party in Ecuador (pp. 260–67).

Indeed, Collins’s theoretical interests are not only in populism but also in social movements. Collins asks why, given that social movements were very successful in Bolivia and Ecuador, culminating in the elections of Morales and Correa, they weakened subsequently. She develops the interesting argument that the movements’ very success contained the seeds of their decline: upon greater inclusion and new social, economic, and political opportunities, indigenous peoples’ priorities became more diverse and the movements divided (pp. 207–9). Analyzing two Ecuadorian provinces in depth, Collins shows that Correa’s decentralization initiative opened political doors for Ecuador’s indigenous peoples (pp. 235–52).

Given the considerable similarities and differences between the two books, a dialogue between the two authors would be very fruitful. I would expect Carrión to ask Collins why she was not concerned about the concentration of power in the executive under Morales and, in particular, about his relentless pursuit of a fourth consecutive term. Carrión aptly states that “[p]opulist leaders say they are the people and their true representatives, but they fear the people’s judgment, which is why they rig the electoral process to stay in power” (p. 209, emphasis in the original); Collins would be asked to respond. In turn, I would expect Collins to ask Carrión why he was not more concerned about the power of traditional Andean elites and whether or not he agreed that, at times, some rules had to be broken to achieve inclusion.

There are issues that I would have liked each author to address in greater detail. While Carrión builds an apt and thoughtful classification of the “varieties of populism”—as mentioned, from “constrained populism” in Colombia to “dominant-authoritarian populism” in Venezuela—he does not develop an argument about exactly why opposition institutions had the strength to constrain Uribe in Colombia but not in the other countries. In Carrión’s defense, it is difficult to build an argument upon only one case of “constraint” and five cases in all, and his book thoroughly describes the institutional struggles in the five countries, but additional effort on this front would be welcome.

While Collins highlights the agency of political leaders—Morales’s greater solidarity with indigenous organizations than Correa’s—as key to the greater longevity of Morales’s party in Bolivia, she does not incorporate structural differences between the two countries into her argument. Collins points out that the size of the indigenous population is much larger in Bolivia than in Ecuador, but she does not elaborate on the impact of this demographic fact for Morales and Correa. Was Morales’s commitment to Bolivia’s indigenous organizations greater than Correa’s, in part, because indigenous peoples composed more than half of Bolivia’s population but only perhaps 20% of Ecuador’s? In addition, throughout, Collins criticizes neoliberalism and the gradual embrace of extractive projects by both Morales and Correa, but (like most scholars) does not propose an alternative path to economic growth in the two countries. Is it possible that Correa was correct that, at least in the short term, he had few options other than the extraction of mineral and oil resources and that the challenge for Ecuador was to secure as many gains among as wide a swath of the population as possible (pp. 174–80)?

But these are quibbles. These two books significantly advance our knowledge about the peril and the potential of populism in the Andes. Both are theoretically stimulating and empirically very rich. And they are even more valuable in conjunction with each other.