^{page 1 note 1} A draft of this article was discussed with Professor Dr Joachim Jeremias of Göttingen, to whose patient and kindly scrutiny it owes much of its tone and certain references. It was complete before the works of Van Vliet and Becker came to hand. Dozent Dr Becker's courtesy in sending the original typescript of his dissertation is gratefully acknowledged. His conclusions as to the meaning of the pericope are not criticized here; when his dissertation is published would be an appropriate time, since many of the points taken in this article were either not noticed, or were inconsistent with his thesis. A summary of this article was delivered at ‘New Testament Today’ (Oxford, 13 September 1961) and will appear in Texte und Untersuchungen. Hints on presentation and a welcome ‘interpretation’ were received from the Rev. Professor C. F. D. Moule, the Rev. H. W. Montefiore, and Professor Dr W. G. Kümmel of Marburg, respectively. A prolonged ‘study-leave’ in Germany was in part financed by the Central Research Fund of the University of London, to which grateful thanks are due. Acknowledgement is due to Dr J. Rosenwasser (of the British Museum) for bibliographical help, for a helpful discussion of sotãh, and for the warning that Danby's translation of Soţãh I, v (Danby's Mishnah, p. 293) is wrong ( means ‘quittance’, cf. commentary of Obadiah di Bertinoro and the correct translation at b. Soţ 7a in the Soncino version, p. 30).

^{page 1 note 2} The commentaries on John by Zahn (1921), Schlatter (1928), Strachan (1943), Hoskyns, ed. Davey (1947) treat the pericope seriously, especially the last in a useful appendix (pp. 563–72). It is ignored by Bultmann (1956), Barrett (1956), Bouyer (1958), and Lightfoot (1957).

^{page 1 note 3} Freih, H., Soden, v., Die Schriften des neuen Testaments in ihrer ältesten erreichbaren Textgestalt, I (Berlin, 1902), 486–524. Becker, cit. p. 2, n. 2. The reason why the pericope appears frequently at the head of John viii is differently explained by Schilling (cited below), who suggests silent references in John to Daniel, and by Becker (p. 79) who sees the explanation in vii. 24 and viii. 15. The writer takes a third view. Note vii. 51, which refers to evidence. Note the rest of viii which is preoccupied with the important question of the admissibility and compelling quality of Jesus' claims—a question leading in typically Jewish fashion to the question of the sufficiency of his evidence. The link between evidence in our pericope and Jesus' own awareness of difficulties regarding his testimony would strike Jewish editors. There is a discussion of viii. 17 by J.-P. Charlier, ‘L'exégèse Johannique d'un précepte légal’, Rev. Bibl. LXVII (1960), 503–15. Aileen Guilding, Fourth Gospel and Jewish Worship (Oxford, 1960), 110–12, 214 n. I, accounts for the situation of our pericope in both John and Luke upon her theory of lections: her claim that the passage did not stray where it now appears seems to be convincing.Google Scholar

^{page 1 note 4} H. Riesenfeld, ‘Die Perikope von der Ehebrecherin in der frühkirchlichen Tradition’, Svensk Exegetick Arsbok (Uppsala), summarized in Int. Zeits. Bibelw. u. Grenzgeb. II (1953/4), no. 500. Apostolic Constitutions, II, 24. Schilling, cited below, p. 15, n. 5, says (p. 96), ‘J. shows God's willingness to forgive even without an audible prayer for mercy’. Since not condemning is very different from forgiving, this cannot be accepted.

^{page 2 note 1} Hoskyns (above); K. Bornhäuser, N.K.Z. XXXVII (1926), 353–63; T. W. Manson, Z.N.W. XLIV (1952/3), 255 f.; T. A. Burkill, Vig. Chr. x (1956), 80–96; B. Weiss, Z. wiss. Theol. XLVI (1903), 141–58. W. Beilner, Christus und die Pharisäer (Vienna, 1959), pp. 123–7 is good. Bultmann says (Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, 3rd edn., 1957, p. 67): ‘…aber schon Jesu anfängliches Schweigen ist singulär und darf als novellistisches Motiv bezeichnet werden; vor allem aber ist dann der ausführliche Schluss, der das Gespräch mit der Frau bringt, ganz novellistisch and sekundär.’ J. Blinzler's investigation, ‘Das Synhedrium von Jerusalem und die Strafprozessordnung der Mischna’, Z.N.W. LII (1961), 54–65, esp. 56, is of great value for our historical reconstruction, especially the canons propounded at p. 59: but in fact each rule has to be seen independently—see p. 15, n. 8 below. Wensinck's excellent point is referred to below, p. 17, n. 2.

^{page 2 note 2} Jesus und die Ehebrecherin. Untersuchungen zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte von Joh. 7, 53–8, 11. Inaugural-Dissertation…der Friederich-Alexander-Universität in Erlangen [1959] (typescript, vol. I text, vol. II notes). See I (from which citations are made below unless otherwise stated) at pp. 72, 82–90.

^{page 2 note 3} A bare skeleton is left. Verses 3a (οι γρ. και οι фαρ.); 6a (τοῦτο…αúτοῦ); 6b (κάτω κúψας…); 8 (πάλıν…); II, and indeed the greater part of the ending are swept away. Becker says (p. 89) ‘…so können wir jetzt antworten: die Perikope…stellt eine stark überarbeitete bzw. erweiterte Form eines synoptischen Streitgespräches dar.’

^{page 2 note 4} Chiefly comparison with rabbinical and N.T. arguments, upon the assumption that any rare or unique feature here must be false; accompanied by the assumption that some words are unnecessary and appeal to popular imagination, filling out an otherwise crisp and sharp-climaxed tale.

^{page 3 note 1} Verse 4: δıδάσκαλε. For instances see Arndt-Gingrich. C. H. Dodd, ‘Jesus as Teacher and Prophet’, Myst. Chr. xxx, 53–66.

^{page 3 note 2} A Wünsche, Neue Beiträge zur Erklärung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midrasch (Göttingen, 1878), cites ‘Erub 63a, Soţāh 22a, Mishn. San. xi, 2.

^{page 3 note 3} I Macc. iv. 46.

^{page 3 note 4} As, for example, in Mark x. 2–10; X. 17; Xii. 18, 28.

^{page 4 note 1} Luke xii. 13–21. Note how the refusal to judge is immediately followed by moral exhortation directed to the would-be litigant and the matter at issue.

^{page 4 note 2} Mishn. Sanh. iv. I. In all references to Mishna, Tractate Sanhedrin, the reader may find it helpful to use Mishnayoth, IV, Order Nezikin (pointed Hebrew text…translation, etc.), ed. Philip Blackman (London, 1954); H. Danby, Tractate Sanhedrin, Mishnah and Tosefta (London, 1919); and H. E. Goldin, Hebrew Criminal Law and Procedure (Mishnah: Sanhedrin, Makkot) (New York, 1952).

^{page 4 note 3} See p. 11, n. 2 below. The parallel study of πορνεια by J. Bonsirven, Le Divorce dans le Nouveau Testament (Tournai, 1948) is relevant.

^{page 4 note 4} Deut. xix. 15, exhaustively and convincingly shown to have been taken for granted in N.T. times and earlier by H. van Vliet, No Single Testimony: A Study on the Adoption of the Law of Deut. XIX, 15 par. into the New Testament (Utrecht, 1958). One notes his statement that the requirement of two witnesses is unique for the oriental legal world (p. 47). Quite apart from Islamic law, which almost certainly did not borrow from Jewish law here, the requirement of two witnesses is notoriously a Hindu rule, of great antiquity, as ought to have been known to Van Vliet, since Frankel (whom he cites) conscientiously considers Manu in his Gerichtliche Beweis at pp. 249, 250, 255, 260.

^{page 4 note 5} A fine digest of the Jewish law of evidence, compiled in a spirit of comparative research, is Z. Frankel's, Der gerichtliche Beweis nach mosaisch-talmudischem Rechte. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntniss des mosaischtalmudischen Criminal- und Civil-rechts(Berlin, 1846), see pp. 121, 285.Google Scholar

^{page 4 note 6} Ibid. p. 118.

^{page 4 note 7} Ibid. p. 116. R. Samuel at B.M. 91a = Sonc. 524. With our κατειληπταı έπ' αúτοфώρῳ compare the opposite at Num. v. 13 c where does not, of course, mean ‘witness’, but ‘evidence’. (For the rabbinical interpretation of = ‘violated’ see Soţ. 2b = Sonc. 3.) Evidence as to intercourse need not include evidence of both penetration and emission (below, p. 8, n. I, Horowitz, Spirit, p. 203), but there is excellent reason for supposing that the witness of copulation (as opposed to ‘seclusion’) could have prevented it (see below, p. 8). Doubt is, in any case, enough. Our Lord's reaction is explained if we assume that he was alive to this doubt.

^{page 5 note 1} If she is found after the departure of, for example, a tradesman, with dishevelled clothing, she obtains a bad name and goes out with k^etūbāh and without any requirement that she should have been warned: Maimonides, M.T. Hilkot Ishūt, XXIV, 15. This is the position emphatically if there is not clear evidence of her unchastity, .

^{page 5 note 2} b. Sanh. 30a = Soncino trans. p. 185. Mekilta on Exod. xxiii (ed. and trans. Lauterbach, III), pp. 169–70. Maimonides, M.T. XIV (Book of Judges), cited from the trans. by A. M. Hershman (New Haven, 1949), II, iv, p. 89. The principle remains even if we abstract the element of Pharisaical finickiness, as the experience of Islamic countries confirms.

^{page 5 note 3} Sanh. 30a = Sonc. 187. O. Bähr, Das Gesetz über falsche, Zeugen nach Bibel und Talmud (Berlin, 1882), pp. 7–8 (the book is preoccupied with the zomemim, who do not concern us, being a rabbinical development from Deut. xix. 15–19). Maimonides, ubi cit. II, iv, p. 91.

^{page 5 note 4} Mishn. Sanh. v. 2. Maimonides, ubi cit. II, ii, I f., pp. 84 f.

^{page 5 note 5} As evidence that in Tannaitic times compelling evidence of adultery was possible, traces survive of hypothetical cases from that period: Tosef. Sanh. vi, 4b; Maimonides, ubi cit. II, xxi, 10, pp. 133–4.

^{page 5 note 6} Num. v. 11–31. Tractate Sotāh. Danby, Mishnah, pp. 293 f.

^{page 6 note 1} Lauterbach, J. Z., ‘The Pharisees and their Teachings’, H.U.C.A. VI (1929), 124 f.Google Scholar

^{page 6 note 2} See p. 5, n. I above. Amram, D. W., ‘Adultery’, Jewish Encycl. I (1901); D. W. Amram, Jewish Law of Divorce according to Bible and Talmud (London, 1897), pp. 122–3; Marcus Cohn, ‘Ehebruch’ in art. Eherecht, Jüdisches Lexikon, II, 267 f.; S. Bialoblocki, ‘Ehebruch’, Encycl. Jud. VI (1930). On the k^etūbāh itself see any Jewish encyclopaedia under Ketubbah; also Z. Frankel, Grundlinien des mosaisch-talmudischen Eherechts (Leipzig, 1860); M. Duschak, Das mosaisch-talmudische Eherecht (Wien, 1864); M. Mielziner, Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce in Ancient and Modern Times…Cincinnati, 1884), pp. 85–9. Examples of pre-c.E. k^etūbot are examined by R. Yaron, J. Sem. Stud. III (1958), I f.; v (1960), 66 f.Google Scholar

^{page 6 note 3} Talmudic Judaism does not recognize the marriage of a woman with her former paramour, but this was an age when adultery was a capital offence: moreover the rule may only have been developing in Jesus' time.

^{page 6 note 4} Hiring of witnesses in this connexion is mentioned in Ket. 46a = Sonc. 262. The comfortable rule is laid down precisely in Ket. 46a = Sonc. 263: if there are witnesses to adultery after the marriage the woman is put to death and no k^etūbāh has to be paid. The husband's heirs also have a direct interest in her being put to death: Sot. 25a–b = Sonc. 126.

^{page 6 note 5} Mid. Rab. ix. 12 on Num. v. 14 = Sonc. (Num.) 261–2; A. Wünsche, Midr. Bemidbar Rabba (1880), 153.Google Scholar

^{page 6 note 6} Op. cit. pp. 94–6.

^{page 7 note 1} Manual of Discipline (Qumran), v. 25–vi. I; Zadokite Fragments cited as Cairo Genizah Document of the Damascus Covenanters, ix. 2–8, 17–23, both cited in extenso by Van Vliet at pp. 57–8. W. D. Davies, Christian Origins and Judaism (London, 1962), p. 103. Lev. xix. 17 is recalled in Luke xvii. 3; Gal vi. 1; Jas. v. 19. Note also Ecclus. xix. 13–17.

^{page 7 note 2} The distinction between the then doctrine of compelling testimony, ‘legal proof’, and the modern system of judicial inquiry (in which the court weighs evidence and is less concerned with admissibility than with credibility) is well brought out by Van Vliet, pp. 2, 7–10.

^{page 7 note 3} The husband had the usufruct of all the wife's property acquired before or after the marriage, and owned all her earnings and chance acquisitions made after the marriage. All her property was under his control, and she could not alienate it without his consent, and even so such a sale affected only the corpus and not the usufruct. If she predeceased her husband he inherited her property. Horowitz, Spirit of Jewish Law, pp. 295–307, 387. Mishn. Ket. iv. 4; vi. I; viii. I f.; ix. I f. It might be argued that this woman might own melog (‘plucking’ property as distinct from ‘iron flock’), which she could transfer to her husband (Horowitz, pp. 296, 300; Danby, Mishn. 795): true, but he would be little advantaged thereby (for he had all the profits of it already), and she alive could give him no more than he would gain from her at her death. It would be difficult to find a clearer case of doubtful motives.

^{page 7 note 4} Lev. XX. 10; Deut. xxii. 22. Not necessarily together: Blinzler, cited p. 11, n. 3 below, at p. 38.

^{page 7 note 5} Stauffer, E., Die Botschaft Jesu (Bern/Münich, 1959), p. 81. Hauck, Th.W.B. IV, 737. Traces of inequitable deviation to the disadvantage of women lie in Book of Jubilees (c. 110 B.C.), M. 8, 9: a man must be stoned for adultery, but the woman burned alive (cf. Mishn. Sanh. ix. 3). Some consciousness of unfairness is evidenced in Hos. iv. 14 (see below, p. 26, n. 3). That the adulterer may have ‘done a deal’ is supposed by I. Abrahams, Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels (Cambridge, 1917), pp. 73–4.Google Scholar

^{page 7 note 6} vi. 32–5 says of the (respectable) husband, ‘he will accept no compensation, nor be appeased though you multiply gifts’.

^{page 8 note 1} The beginning and end of intercourse are referred to in Kid. 10a = Sonc. 38; that time is required is noticed in Yev. 11a = Sonc. 53–4; Ket. 11b = Sonc. 61; Sot. i. I. The time needed for ‘seclusion’, that is sexual contact as opposed to full intercourse, is the time needed to walk round a date-palm: a discussion of this ancient estimate appears at Sot. 3b–4a = Sonc. 13. That for some purposes penetration is as good as full coitus is shown by Yev. vi. I, and the view of some to this effect is evidenced at Sot. 26b = Sonc. 132. But that coitus in general means the distinctive movements and not mere penetration is asserted in Shev. 14b = Sonc. 68; 18a = 91; 18b = 92–3.

^{page 8 note 2} Frankel, op. cit. pp. 122, 287.

^{page 9 note 1} B.K. 90b =Sonc. 522.

^{page 9 note 2} Deut. xiii. 9; xvii. 6–7. On the procedure, see p. 22, n. I below.

^{page 9 note 3} As thought by Bornhäuser and now Becker (pp. 159–60).

^{page 9 note 4} Sanh. 41a = Sonc. 267 (closed c. 30 A.D.); for this and other authorities see Goldin, p. 26 (he points out that Maimonides, Hilkot San. xiv. 13, i.e. Book of judges, transl. A. M. Hershman (1949), p. 41, was of that opinion, but adds the references, e.g. Sanh. 376, for the opinion of the school of Hezekiah that the ius gladii was taken away only in A.D. 70); Deut. xvii. 10; Megillah Ta'anit (A.D. 68) records a feast on the 22nd Elul to commemorate the reimposition of capital punishment for offences against the Law (Dalman, Aramäische Dialektproben (Leipzig, 1927), p. 43). J. Jeremias, ‘Zur Geschichtlichkeit des Verhörs Jesu vor dem hohen Rat’, Z.N.W. XLIII (1950–1), 145–50. W. Stauffer, Jesus, Gestalt und Geschichte (Bern, 1957), pp. 16 f.T.A. Burkill, ubi cit. p. 2, n. 1 sup. Hoenig, cited p. 15, n. 8 below, goes, at p. 209, beyond his authorities. Amram, cited p. 6, n. 2 above, at p. 217 seems a little too positive as to the husband's alternatives at this period. Paul Winter (On the Trial of Jesus (Berlin, 1961), pp. 15, 67 f., 75 f.) manfully defies Maimonides in the choice between Jewish traditions. His arguments that the Sanhedrin still possessed the ius gladii are forceful, but ignore Megillah Ta'anĩt (above), rely too much on Burkill, on an overelaborate method of subverting the evidential value of John xviii. 31b, and on happenings in following decades which can be explained partly by lynchings, and partly by a genuine restoration to the Jews of greater measures of autonomy before the final catastrophe. Winter frankly acknowledges his biases: these have blinded him to many possibilities which his tour de force does not take into account. In particular we may take his suggestion that Pilate, at John xviii. 31a, is inviting the Jews to save him the trouble of putting Jesus to death. Pilate is shown, on the contrary, either (a) asking them to try (and punish) Jesus according to the Law, unaware that in their view of that Law he merited death and no lesser penalty, or, what is far from impossible, (b) authorizing them to carry out a death sentence by Jewish, rather than Roman, methods. Since the Jews' object was to avoid sole responsibility, Winter's failure to test these hypotheses (which conflict with his theory of minimal Jewish complicity in the death of Jesus) is unsatisfactory.

^{page 10 note 1} As thought by Blinzler, Jeremias (Z.N.W. XLIII, 148–9), Grundmann (1959) and Stauffer (Botschaft, 80 f.).Google Scholar

^{page 10 note 2} In Theod. Sus. 41 it means ‘condemn’. So Moulton-Milligan. Bauer (W.z.N.T.) is clear, Arndt-Gingrich adequate, Liddell-Scott definite. All N.T. examples go the same way, with the possible exception of II Pet. ii. 6. In the LXX κατακρινω = (condemn). Epict. III, xviii, 9 (κατακρıνειν) instances ‘pass adverse judgement’; Ibid., I, i, 30 (κατακέκρıσαı) beautifully instances ‘condemn to (exile, etc.)’. κατάκρıσıς is naturally ‘condemnation’. On the other hand κατάκρıμα implies ‘punishment following upon sentence’; in papyri it means ‘judgement’, or even ‘penal servitude’ (see Moulton-Milligan). Grundmann (op. cit. p. 246), seems embarrassed: ‘keiner hat…an ihn die Verurteilung vollzogen?’ But this is unnecessary.

^{page 10 note 3} έν δέ τῷ νóμῷ ήμınu; Μω υ¨σῆ ένετειλας τάς τοıαúτας σú τι λέγεıς; Some manuscripts read σú…λέγεıς περι αúτῆς; The difference is not considerable. here continues the narrative. Liddell-Scott; Blass-Debrunner (10th edn., 1959), §451, pp. 283–4 (trans. R. W. Funk, Cambridge/Chicago, 1961, p. 235, col. i); J. D. Denniston, Greek Particles, 1st edn. (Oxford, 1934), pp. 416, 425–6.

^{page 10 note 4} Bornhäuser rejected this for insufficient reasons: N.K.Z. XXXVII (1926), 353–4, but see E. Stauffer, ‘Neue Wege der Jesus-forschung’, Wiss. Z. d. U. Halle-W. VII (1958), 451 f. at 456, 466.Google Scholar

^{page 11 note 1} The law applicable was the celebrated lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis (Mart. VI, 7, 22; Dig. IV. 4, 37, I; XLVIII. 5; Cod. IX, 9, 3, 17; Inst. IV, 18, 4—beware of imperial revision of the provisions of the lex!). Adultery became a capital offence in the third century (Cod. II, 4, 18; IX, 9, 9). The position is explained concisely in Th. Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 698–9.

^{page 11 note 2} References at Blinzler (next note), pp. 34, 40.

^{page 11 note 3} Ezek. xvi. 38–40; xxiii. 45–8. J. Blinzler, ‘Die Strafe für Ehebruch in Bibel und Halacha zur Auslegung von Joh. viii. 5’, N.T.S. IV (1957–8), 32–47.

^{page 11 note 4} Blinzler, , ubi cit. sup., last note, at p. 40.Google Scholar

^{page 11 note 5} Date: c. 80 B.C. For the texts (LXX and Theodotion) see A. Rahlfs, Septuaginta, II, 864 f.; H. B. Swete, Old Testament in Greek (1912), 111, 576 f.; R. H. Charles, Apocrypha and Pseudepigraphia of the Old Testament (1913), I, 647 f. For discussion, W. O. E. Oesterley, Introd. to the Books of the Apocrypha (London, 1953), pp. 281–6; E. J. Goodspeed, Story of the Apocrypha (Chicago, 1939, 1956), 65 f.; C. C. Torrey, Apocryphal Literature (New Haven, London, 1945, 1953), pp. 107–111; F. Zimmermann, J.Q.R. XLVIII (1957–8), 236–41; M. Waxman, Hist. of Jewish Literature (New York, London, 1960), I, 15; Van Vliet, op. cit. pp. 51–2. For relevance note the collocation of the pericope with Susanna in the Missal (Sat. after 3rd Sunday in Lent); also Goodspeed, cit. sup. pp. 69–70, 124. D. Daube, N.T. and Rab. Jud., p. 91, says Daniel here ‘advocates a Pharisaic innovation’ and the book demonstrates (p. 230) ‘the superiority of the rational modern method’ (cf. his article in Rev. Int. des Dr. de l'Ant. II (1949), 200 f.)—sed quaere? F. A. Schilling, ‘Story of Jesus and the Adultress’, Ang. Theol. Rev. XXXVII (1955), 91–106 at 98 f.; Becker, pp.144f. There is no ground for supposing (as Schmidtke, cited Ibid. II, 109) that our pericope is a conscious fabrication antithetical to Lev. xx. 10 and a counterpart to Susanna; nor that the pericope is intended to show Jesus as an anti-Daniel, compassionate rather than severe (as Schilling, pp. 98–9).

^{page 11 note 6} LXX Sus. 60–2: και ώς ó νóμος δıαγορεúεı δıαγορεúεı έúποıησαν αúτοıς καθώς έπονηρεúσαν το κατά τῆς άδελφής και έφιμωσαν αúτοúς και éξαγαγóντες ἒρρıψαν εıς φάραγγα. (Becker, II, 121, n. 12, takes this as evidence of Pharisaic development of the law, sed quaere?) Theodot. merely refers to Deut. xix. 19: …καıάπέκıναν αúτοúς.

^{page 11 note 7} Because the elders were given the punishment which would have been inflicted upon Susanna: D. Daube, N.T. and Rabbinic Judaism (London, 1956), p. 307, n. I.

^{page 11 note 8} Deut. xiii. 9–10; Luke iv. 29; John x. 31 f.

^{page 11 note 9} Acts v. 26 (narrow escape); xix. 5, 19 (non-Jewish jurisdictions); II Cor. xi. 25. The case of Stephen (Acts vii. 58–9) was almost certainly a lynching. Cf. Luke xx. 6.

^{page 12 note 1} Frankel, op. cit. p. 104 is frank. Danby, Tr. Sanh., introd., likewise. Mishn. Sanh. ix. 3. Blinzler, ‘Die Strafe…’, at pp. 38–9 refers to A. Büchler, ‘Die Todesstrafen der Bibel und der jüdischnachbiblischen Zeit’, Mon. Gesch. Wiss. des Judenthums, L (1906), 539–62; 664–706, esp. 683–6. Daube, op. cit. pp. 304 ff. Winter's chapter ‘Jewish Death Penalties’ is not his most successful. He casts doubt on the Pharisees' theory (see p. 71, refs. at p. 189) but his substitute is not entirely convincing.

^{page 12 note 2} But not excessive delay. Cases were not to be heard at night, adverse sentences were to be postponed (Mishn. Sanh. iv. 1; v. 5), and opportunities were offered for holding up proceedings.

^{page 12 note 3} Num. xxv. 5–15. Phinehas' act was ratified ex post facto, which evidences discomfort even amongst Jews who were proud of him. Zimri seems to have defied a proclamation, however (v. 6). Boaz Cohen, cit. inf. n. 7, at pp. 116–17.

^{page 12 note 4} Sanh. 82a–b = Sonc. 545–8.

^{page 12 note 5} On Phinehas as a model in pre-Christian centuries see I Macc. ii. 19–21, 26–7, 54; IV Macc. xviii. 12. See the very relevant remarks of W. R. Farmer, ‘The Patriarch Phinehas: a Note on “it was reckoned to him as righteousness”, Ang. Theol. Rev. XXXIV (1952), 26–30, particularly at p. 28.

^{page 12 note 6} Sanh. 81b = Sonc. 542; Mishn. Sanh. ix. 6. Those who take in the act may punish: if they do not they cannot charge the guilty person before the Bet-dĩn.

^{page 12 note 7} Cohen, Boaz, ‘Self-help in Jewish and Roman Law’, Rev. Int. Dr. Ant. 3rd ser. II (1955), 107–33, at 112 f. He cites Palestinian rabbinical modifications: the offence must be in public: p. Sanh. ix. 7 (Schwab, 1933, XI, 38). There is a very short discussion of self-help at B.K. 27b = Sonc. 144. H. E. Goldin, Heb. Crim. Law (p. 4, n. 2 above), pp. 30 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 13 note 1} Deut. xvii. 12–13; Mishn. Sanh. xi. 2; Sanh. 86b–89a = Sonc. 572–89. Cf. Sanh. 99a = Sonc. 672: ‘one who gives an interpretation of the Torah not according to the halachah has no portion in the world to come.’ Maimonides, ubi cit. II, iii, iv. Wünsche, Neue Beiträge, cited above, p. 529. Winter attempts (pp. 129–30) to show that the concept ‘orthodoxy’ was non-Jewish, and that Jesus' teaching did not lead to his death. There is much in the latter point (though he dismisses evidence of Jesus' being watched and tempted as inventions of the Church), but he ignores the force of biblical law.

^{page 13 note 2} If the law then was according to Mishn. Sanh. xi. 2.

^{page 13 note 3} So Hitzig (1843), Jeremias, Grundmann, Westcott, and Lightfoot, but apparently not the editors of the Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture (1953), p. 997. On the attitude of the Roman government to Jewish messianic sects, and political implications, Winter, op. cit. passim, is excellent.

^{page 13 note 4} Sanh. 40b–41a = Sonc. 262–7; 80b = Sonc. 535–6. Blinzler, op. cit. utilizes this rule at p. 41. Jeremias, ‘Untersuchungen zum Quellenproblem der Apostelgeschichte’, Z.N.W. XXXVI (1937), 209–11, gives many references.Google Scholar

^{page 13 note 5} See the lexicons under (cf. Mishn. B.K. ii. 4) and (cf. Exod. xxi. 29). See p. 14, n. 4 below.

^{page 13 note 6} Because it is ‘laudable to conceal and cover infirmity’ four witnesses must see the couple in the very act: C. Hamilton, Heddya (London, 1791), II, 3 f. It is rational that two pairs of witnesses should depose to an act which (as zinnā' alone) cannot take place without the simultaneous criminality of two people acting mutually. But reason is not referred to. The authorities are Qur'ān iv. 19 (early) and xxiv. 4 (late Medinan). The ‘revelation’ dealt with a scandal attaching to Ayesha, Muhammad's favourite wife (on which see p. 300 n., of Palmer's trans., World's Classics Ser. or Sale's note to his trans. of Q.xxiv. 11–20). Subject to repealing legislation, the rule persists in many Islamic countries and renders adultery virtually impossible to punish, except upon confession.

^{page 13 note 7} The indirect references contained in hypothetical cases in rabbinical literature: p. 5, n. 5 above. The case of Mariamne, wife of Herod, is perhaps no precedent (she was put to death on suspicion and partly on political grounds), and indeed the acts of Herod are hardly to be taken as cases in Jewish law. Josephus is curiously silent (Ant. IV, viii) about the penalty for adultery by a married woman: this may imply rather that he avoided his readers' unfavourable comment than that he regarded the rule as impractical.Google Scholar

^{page 14 note 1} Rabbinical rules developed after that time. A good instance is the provision regarding the ‘stubborn and rebellious son’. The rabbis so developed this (Sanh. 68b–72a = Sonc. 465–89; J. Kohler, Z.V.R. xx (1907), 237) that execution was impossible. Yet instances were actually alleged to have occurred: Ibid. 71a. And Herod refers to the institution as operative (Jos. Ant. XVI, xi, 2, Niese, IV, 54–5) and Josephus himself gives a good full account of it as current and effective (Jos. Ant. IV, viii, 24, Niese, I, 213–14).

^{page 14 note 2} Zadokite fragments (c. temp. Chr. or a decade earlier) x. 16 (Charles, Apo. and Pseud. II, 825). II Cor. xiii. 2.

^{page 14 note 3} Vliet, Van, pp. 38, 53. The rabbis knew that the Romans and other heathens did not require proof of previous warning: Sanh. 57b; Midr. Rab. Gen., trans. Freedman (1951), p. 279.Google Scholar

^{page 14 note 4} Gen. iv. 6; Exod. xix, 21–2; Deut. xxx. 19–20; 19, 21. The law is God's ‘witness’ (xxii. 26), ‘warning’ (N.T.S. VII (1961), 370–4). Van Vliet, p. 72, draws attention to this, and to (Admonition, Testimony) in II Kings xvii. 13 () and Neh. ix. 29 (). See also Soph. Sal. xii. 2, 10, 20, 25–6, and an interpretation of the commandments referred to by Jeremias, Z.N.W. XXXVI, 210–11.

^{page 14 note 5} Revel, B., Karaite Halakah (Philadelphia, 1913), p. 51, cited by Van Vliet, p. 141 (n. 537).Google Scholar

^{page 14 note 6} Lev. xx. 17: ‘see’; Deut. xxii. 24: ‘word’; Exod. xxi. 14: ‘presumptuously’; Num. xv. 33: ‘gathering’. Sanh. 40 b = Sonc. 263. Horowitz, 167–9, calls hatrā'āh (warning) a ‘merciful impracticality’.

^{page 14 note 7} The presumption is that she ‘cried out’, i.e. the court must believe that she was forced, so that she herself avoids the death-penalty (Deut. xxii. 24, 26). That she can be a witness against him is clear from the principle in the sodomy case: Yev. 25a = Sonc. 154.

^{page 15 note 1} All systems of law are alive to the tendency of girls who regret illicit, but consensual, intercourse to claim that ‘someone’, or a particular person, committed rape. As a result ‘corroboration’ is invariably insisted upon. Thus justification for the Torah's abandoning the alleged principle of ‘warning’ before two witnesses in this one instance will be hard to find. ‘Warning’ as such (irrespective of witnesses) is there, of course. She herself has warned him! See the case of Tamar (II Sam. xiii. 11–14).

^{page 15 note 2} Sanh. 8b, 41a = Sonc. 37, 265; 72b = Sonc. 494. Makk. 6b = Sonc. 34; 9b = Sonc. 58. Maimonides, ubi cit. I, xii, 34 says that even a scholar must be warned; this is a late development. Warning is needed to elicit the distinction between ignorance and presumption.

^{page 15 note 3} Sonc. Sanh., index, Mesith; Prophet, false; Rebellious elder. A mesit was a layman seducing Israelites to idolatry; the Pharisees later gave him an opportunity to retract.

^{page 15 note 4} The reasoning is too complicated for discussion here: see Sanh. 88b = Sonc. 587.

^{page 15 note 5} The rabbinical ‘false witness’, i.e. those refuted because, being elsewhere, they could not have seen what they say they saw: Sanh. 40b = Sonc. 259; 86b = Sonc. 570. See p. 5, n. 3 above.

^{page 15 note 6} Sanh. 72b = Sonc. 494–5. The enemy is virtually warned: Makk. 9b = Sonc. 56–8.

^{page 15 note 7} Cf. Sanh. 8b = Sonc. 36–7 (R. Papa speaks of a scholarly woman!). Sanh. 41a = Sonc. 264; Sot. 25a = Sonc. 122–3. Cf. also the anomalous dictum, ‘A man is always regarded as fore-warned…’ (on thieves breaking jugs), in Sanh. 72a = Sonc. 490. Maimonides, ubi cit. II, xxi, 5 (following talmudic sources as always) gives examples of testimony of a woman's secluding herself with a paramour, and testimony of adultery: due warning is essential for her liability, and for their refutation (evidence that cannot be refuted is inadmissible). See also warning followed by adultery followed by divorce in the Mishna, Sotāh vi. I.

^{page 15 note 8} Acts iv. 17; ix. 1. Jeremias, Z.N.W. XXXVI, 211–13, following Bornhäuser, N.K.Z. XXXIII (1922), 332–3. It is of interest to notice another rule favoured by the Pharisees (that of the 39 strokes) which was in force temp. Chr.: II Cor. xi. 24; Jos. Ant. IV, vii, 23; XIII, x, 6 cited by S. B. Hoenig, Great Sanhedrin (Philadelphia, 1953), p. 209 (his conclusions, however, seem to go too far: each rule must be seen separately).Google Scholar

^{page 15 note 9} Mark ii. 24–8 (Jeremias, last note, also Stauffer, ‘Neue Wege’, p. 457); iii. 2, 6; John v. 10. In III Macc. ii. 24; V. 18, 30, 33, 37; IV Macc. iv. 8, 24; vii. 2; viii. 19; ix. 32; xiii. 6; xiv. 9 άπεıλή seems to be ‘warning’, but it shades into ‘threat’, as in I Pet. ii. 23.

^{page 16 note 1} Sanh. 81b = Sonc. 541; Mishn. Sanh. ix. 5.

^{page 16 note 2} Sanh. 33b = Sonc. 211.

^{page 16 note 3} Becker, pp. 157–9.Google Scholar

^{page 16 note 4} For Wensinck see below, p. 17, n. 2. Orchard and others (he doodled); Strachan (meaningless marks); Westcott (unwilling to speak); Macgregor, Dummelow, Hoskyns and others (he refuses to give judgement); Temple (hides his confusion); Manson (ironically pretends to draft a judgement). R. Eisler, ‘Jesus und die ungetreue Braut’, Z.N.W. XXII (1923), 305–7, at 306 suggested that he indicated the vanity of the questioners and their question, citing Jer. xvii. 13. A far-fetched suggestion in an otherwise helpful discussion. Becker, who cites previous explanations (p. 84), would excise the passage and eliminate the problem. A suggestion by Dr Gertner ought to be recorded: the husband's ‘jealousy’ (Num. v. 14) leads to a taking of the dust of the floor of the tabernacle and a writing of curses (Ibid. xvii. 21–3) or at any rate an allusion to the sotāh ritual. But the husband is not present, Jesus was not a priest, confession was otiose (and in the ritual she must refuse to confess), and allusion to curses is hardly appropriate. In any case we must remember that Num. v was an improvement upon the situation obtaining before, evidenced in Judah's conduct at Gen. xxxviii. 24. Jesus can hardly appeal by allusion to sotāh in a situation incompatible with sotāh. Philo (De Spec. Leg. III, x, 52–9) indicates that the dust and water of the ritual symbolize innocence. Guilding, op. cit. p. 112 suggests Jesus wrote the decalogue, since Deut. ix. to is related as a lectionary reading to John vii–viii.

^{page 17 note 1} E.g. a few manuscripts' reading of v. 8 and the Armenian ‘Papias-text’ (Becker, p. 103). Perhaps encouraged by the interesting form κατέγροφεν (v.I. ἒγραφεν). The former is more commonly used for ‘entering up’, ‘setting down’, ‘consigning’, and even ‘conveying’ (Moulton-Milligan, p. 325). It does imply serious and bold writing, as if of more permanent value than the circumstances permitted.

^{page 17 note 2} Wensinck, A. J., ‘John viii. 6, 8’, Amicitiae Corolla (Fests. J. R. Harris) (London, 1933), pp. 300–2, uses an Islamic tradition of the Prophet's writing with a stick on the ground when pondering over a question: ‘this is the gesture of one who is reflecting upon a serious question’, and not of one attempting to evade it. He does not consider whether the tradition is not copied from John viii. 6, 8! But the point is valid, and he cites other examples from Islamic contexts.Google Scholar

^{page 17 note 3} E.g. Ps. i. 1–2; Sap. Sal. i. 5 f.; Ecclus. xi. 9; xiii. 1.

^{page 17 note 4} B.M. 69a–b = Sonc. 402–3. When a Samaritan litigant accused R. Papa of partiality he condescended to cite his authority—obviously a phenomenon. The Talmud is filled with examples of sentences of the great rabbis, the reasons of which were a matter of speculation even amongst their pupils and academic descendants. See Maimonides, xiv, xxi, 10 (trans. Hershman, 1949, p. 65), where he cites Exod. xxiii. 7a.

^{page 18 note 1} Nadelmann, K. H., ‘The Judicial Dissent. Publication vs. Secrecy’, Amer. J. Comp. Law, viii (1959), 415–32. The Jewish law relating to the ‘rebellious elder’ took cognisance only of cases where the rabbi's reasoning failed to agree with that of the supreme court.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 18 note 2} For Jesus' oral citation of Torah to Scribes and Pharisees see Mark vii. 10; but that is a spontaneous, independent reference to texts to which his questioners were not alluding.

^{page 18 note 3} Deut. xvii. 7.

^{page 19 note 1} Horowitz, op. cit. p. 640. Above p. 9, n. 2.

^{page 19 note 2} Vague references to false witnesses, e.g. Prov. vi. 19, are wide of the mark since they do not touch the members of the crowd who were not witnesses, nor was the ‘falsity’ certain. The rule that two or three witnesses are required (Deut. xvii. 6; xix. 15) does not touch an issue. Lev. v. I is not in point as no one suggests that vital evidence is being withheld. The commands not to bear false witness (Exod. xx. 16; Deut. v. 20) suffer from defects mentioned above. Lev. xix. 16–17 are not irrelevant but vague, and not exactly to the point: moreover a phrase of satisfactory length is not forthcoming—the only exception, the famous commandment , has in fact a totally different connotation, namely, the Jew's duty to save his brother from physical as opposed to moral (v. 17) danger. The elaborate exposition of the penalties for ‘false witness’ in Deut. xix would be cumber-some, not to the point, and difficult to allude to in the space available. Serious thought must be given to Deut. xvii. 7. This text directly affects the situation, and is linked with Jesus' words. Moreover, we have the key word to which Jesus actually alludes, and its correlative . But it is mechanical, no one doubted its meaning, everyone present was relying upon it anyhow, and no suitable group of words comes within sixteen characters. Texts dealing with adultery as a crime and even the not irrelevant Hosea are out of the question, for no one disputed that adultery was a crime, or what its ingredients were, and the passages are not related to the procedure to which Jesus certainly applied his mind, as we see from the answer.

^{page 19 note 3} Midr. Rabbah, Lam. iv. 2, 3–4 = Sonc. 218 (do not attend a dinner…, do not sign a deed…).

^{page 19 note 4} See p. 20, n. 1. Also Horowitz, G., The Spirit of Jewish Law (New York, 1953), p. 685. Mekilta on Exod. xxii. 1b (ed. Lauterbach, III, 160–1).Google Scholar

^{page 19 note 5} The implications in the former are of corruption and malice, and in the latter reliability and faithfulness. See Isa. viii. 2; Jer. xlii. 5. On see Van Vliet, pp. 49, 67, and refs.

^{page 19 note 6} Mishn. San. iii. San. 25a–b = Sonc. 146–60; B.K. 72b = Sonc. 415; Yev. 25a = Sonc. 154. Maimonides, ubi cit. II, ix, p. 100 f.; x, p. 102; I, xviii, p. 50 f.; xix, p. 53 f. (a vast number of disqualified persons). Z. Frankel, Gerichtliche Beweis, pp. 118–21, 246–80. J. Kohler, Z.V.R. xx (1907), 257 f. Note the law relating to zomemim, ‘plotting witnesses’, evidencing the Pharisaic tendency to limit the application of severe punishment, is post-C.E. in so far as it unreasonably limits the definition of one liable to the penalties set out in Deut. xix. 18–19; but the general principle is of course far older.

^{page 20 note 1} Jos. Vita, § 49 (cited by Van Vliet, pp. 27–8); Ant. IV, viii, 15 (Niese, I, 206) is sound. The requirement of ‘competence’ is bound up with Exod. xx. 16; xxiii. I; Deut. v. 20; xix. 15–19. Jewish law, like Islamic and Hindu law, was concerned with competence of witnesses where today we are concerned with the credibility of any evidence tendered. A consciousness of the Jewish meanings of ‘false’ witness is present in tit. IX of the very interesting Mosaicarum et Romanarum Legum Collatio, ed. Th. Mommsen, Collectio Librorum Iuris Anteiustiniani (ed. Krüger et al.), III (Berlin, 1890), 167 f. There, discussing de familiaris testimonio non admittendo, Ulpian's rules on the lex Iulia de ui publica et priuata (see Dig. xxii. 5, 3, 5) are compared with Exod. xx. 16 (falsum testimonium non dab). In Islamic law great attention is paid to the requirement that a witness must be 'āidal: the similarities with Jewish law are striking but both draw on a common customary source. C. Hamilton, Hedàya, II (1791), 671–92. My friend Professor Dr O. Spies summarizes the position: ‘'Adal ist einer, der keine grosse Sünde begangen hat noch sich gewohnheitsmässig Verstösse gegen das Gesetz zuschulden kommen lässt.’ A comparison of Quranic and rabbinical provisions on evidence was made by R. Roberts, Social Laws of the Qorân… (London, 1925), pp. 34–5. A peculiarity of Islamic law is that the court is obliged independently to inquire into the competence of witnesses. For Hindu law (dharmaśāstra) we have noted, p. 4, n. 4, references to Manu (VIII, 61–71) by Frankel. There is also Manu, v, 106; and other sources are authoritatively represented in A. Thakur, Hindu Law of Evidence or a Comparative Study…according to the Smrtis (Calcutta, 1933), pp. 84–96, 108 f.; P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra (Poona, 1946), III, 334–41.

^{page 20 note 2} On the great importance of the Targum Onkelos as a source on the language and beliefs of the time of Christ see P. Kahle, ‘Das palästinische Pentateuchtargum und das zur Zeit Jesu gesprochene Aramäisch’, Z.N.W. XLIX (1958), 100–16. Onk. has (ed. Sperber, 1959, p. 127). J. W. Etheridge translates (1862, p. 396): ‘Nor set thine hand with the wicked to be a false witness for him.’ Vulg.: ut pro impio dicas falsum testimonium.

^{page 20 note 3} Gertner, M., ‘Midrashim in the New Testament’, J. Sem. Stud. VII (1962), 267 f., at pp. 270, 272, 280, 283, 292; also idem, ‘The Masorah and the Levites’, Vet. Test. x (1960), 241 f., at pp. 262, 274–5. He refers to Sanh. 34a, and to an example at Ber. 64a (end). A flamboyant illustration occurs at Midr. Rab. Lev. xviii. I (on Lev. xv. i f.) = Sonc. 223. There is read (i) bore'echa (thy creator); (ii) be'ercha (thy well); and (iii) borecha (thy pit). That this very verse (Exod. xxiii. I) was subject to an shown in Pes. 118a = Sonc. 607–8 (also Makk. 23a = Sonc. 161), where, instead of an alternative reading is used to connect slander with being cast to dogs (by the technique of interpretation by proximity to other verses—in this case Exod. xxiii. Ia is read harmoniously with the immediately preceding Exod. xxii. 30 (31 c)). That different pointings of (Exod. xxiii. I c) were in use is suggested by Mekilta ad loc. (Lauterbach, III, 160–1 ).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 21 note 1} Targ. Onk. (Etheridge, p. 396). The rabbinical rule is that one must follow the majority (of proofs or instances, of opinions), e.g. Mid. Rab. S.S. vii. 5, 2 = Sonc. 286. That Exod. xxiii. 2 meant that a majority should always be followed was an hermeneutical distortion, on which Dr Gertner's treatment of Decision by Majority in Jewish law is awaited.

^{page 21 note 2} Hul. 134a = Sonc. 762.

^{page 21 note 3} With both Exod. xxiii. 4, 5 cf. the tone of Deut. xxii. 1–4. Targ. Ps. Jonathan (Etheridge, p. 522). Philo, Supp. II, Questions and Answers on Exodus, trans. R. Marcus (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 45–6 (on Exod. ii.* 11, 12). Midr. Rab. Gen. xxxviii. 3 = Sonc. 303 (ref. Exod. xxiii. 5): evil must not be rewarded with evil. Midr. Rab. Lev. ix. 9 = Sonc. 115: 4 and 5 are maxims making for peace.

^{page 21 note 4} See Philo, Midr. Rab. Gen. cited above. In Pes. 113b = Sonc. 583 this is used to show that accusation by a single person is a possibility: however, one may hate someone only when his fault is observed by two witnesses. Maimonides (M.T. XI, v, xiii, 14, Book of Torts, trans. H. Klein, 1954, p. 236) takes the view that one may hate the Israelite wrongdoer whom one alone has seen committing the offence: but one is bound to help him.

^{page 21 note 5} It is understood as a helping-verse with xxiii. 2: a judgement for conviction requires a majority of two and not a bare majority (Sanh. 36b = Sonc. 228). Mekilta, Lauterbach, ubi cit. p. 168.

^{page 22 note 1} άναμάρτηος = ‘without sin’ (cf. II Macc. viii. 4). So, correctly, Wunsche (Neue Beitrāge, p. 530) as far back as 1878, and Grundmann, Ev. nach Markus, 2nd ed. (1959), pp. 245–7—not, as Schlatter, ‘Wer unter euch nicht gesündigt hat….’ Rengstorf (Th.W.B. I, 338) agrees that the word implies freedom from all sin, but his reasoning is not apt (Becker, II, 124, n. 21). We have seen, p. 19, n. 6, that many Pharisaic rules of the post-C.E. rabbinical texts were not in force temp. Chr. The elaborate rules regarding stoning (Mishn. Sanh. vi. 4; Sanh. 44b–45b = Sonc. 293–9; Maimonides, ubi cit. I, xv, I, p. 42) according to which the second, i.e. the younger, witness casts the first (heavy) stone, fit excellently with our situation, but are not presupposed by Jesus' reply, and it is unlikely that in practice the younger threw first.

^{page 22 note 2} This exact point appears in the anonymous Syrian Chronicle of the World which here stems from the chronicle of Zacharias Rhetor, in which our pericope appeared as an episode. The entire version shows that the explanation given in this article was understood in eastern Mediterranean circles in the late fifth century. Ahrens-Krüger, Die sogen. Kirchengeschichte des Zacharias Rhetor (Leipzig, 1899), 164 f., cited by Becker, p. 163.

^{page 22 note 3} Suborned witnesses were certainly disqualified: Makk. 6a = Sonc. 31. The general point was seen by A. Wünsche, Neue Beiträge, p. 530.

^{page 22 note 4} Sot. 2a = Sonc. 2.

^{page 23 note 1} The LXX had a different reading, possibly because of a need felt at some time for a contrast rather than a threat. This proves that the text was open to various interpretations at the period in question.

^{page 23 note 2} Targ. Ps. Jonathan (Etheridge, p. 522).

^{page 23 note 3} Shev. 30b = Sonc. 170–1. Targ. Onk. translates by which, like itself, has the connotation ‘decree’, ‘affair’, ‘rule’, or even, as in Isa. viii. 10, ‘communication consistent with conspiracy or enmity’. Maimonides, ubi cit. I, xxiii, 10, p. 68 (citation of Exod. xxiii. 7).

^{page 23 note 4} Cf. Ps. ci. 3, 7.

^{page 23 note 5} The nature of things makes this inevitable, but it is attested in Mishn. Sanh. iii. 6; Sanh. 29a = Sonc. 175; Maimonides ubi cit. xiv, p. 35.

^{page 23 note 6} Since he takes upon himself the sin of ‘joining with another…’ if he adds his testimony to that of a person whom he believes to be ‘wicked’. Naturally, he does not guarantee the freedom of the elder man from sins of which he has no knowledge and of which in the ordinary course of events he ought not to have had knowledge. It was just possible that the younger man was not told by the husband or his elder colleague the purpose of their visit to the place, and that he did what he did more or less innocently. He need not have been over 14 years of age, after all.

^{page 23 note 7} See p. 5, n. 2 above, also Sanh. 8b = Sonc. 37–8.

^{page 23 note 8} See p. 7 above.

^{page 24 note 1} Sanh. 73a–75a = Sonc. 495–506; Mishn. Sanh. viii. 7. Goldin, op. cit. pp. 177–8.

^{page 24 note 2} The description of the court-scene is obviously Hellenistic and betrays the foreign origin of the surviving versions; what concerns us is the framework of the story as we know it existed contemporaneously with our episode. On its history see W. Baumgartner, ‘Susanna. Die Geschichte einer Legende’, Archiv f. Religionswiss. xxiv (1926–7), 259–80, particularly at pp. 277 f., 279 f. Also the same, ‘Der weise Knabe and die des Ehebruchs beschuldigte Frau’, A. f. Rel.w. XXVII (1929), 187–8. M. Wurmbrand, ‘A Falasha Variant of the Story of Susanna’, Biblica, XLIV (1863), 29–35.

^{page 24 note 3} Oesterley, Aprocr. (cited above), pp. 283–6. Was there an allusion to Susanna in Ps. Sal. (LXX), iv. 4?

^{page 24 note 4} Previous note. Simeon b. Shetah's advice is preserved in part in Mishn. Avot i. 9. See succinct note at Sonc. trans. Makkot, p. 27 n. 7. Van Vliet, pp. 52–3. Baumgartner, pp. 261 f.

^{page 24 note 5} Susanna was at one stage included in the book of Daniel. In Sanh. 93a = Sonc. 624–5 the villainy of Ahab and Zedekiah towards Nebuchadnezzar's daughter is related and Jer. xxix. 21–3 is connected with the Susanna story. Schilling, cited above, p. 11, n. 5, at 99–100.

^{page 24 note 6} Jos. Ant. x, xi, 7 (Niese, I, 317).

^{page 24 note 7} πρεσβυτέροı, πρεσβυüταı. Both versions of Sus. 41 (Theod. 41b) emphasize that it was because they were πρεσβυτέροı (the very word in John viii.9a) they were believed by the court. The Didascalia (cited by Zahn, Ev. des Johannes, 1921, pp. 726–7) says, num condemnaverunt te presbyteri, filia mea. Daniel's questions appear at Sus. 51–9.

^{page 24 note 8} Sus. 53c: άθῷον και δικαıον οúκ άποκτενεıς.

^{page 24 note 9} Targ. Ps. Jonathan (Etheridge, p. 522). Exod. xxiii. 7b was also used by the rabbis to show that no conviction might be arrived at upon circumstantial evidence: Maimonides, ubi cit. I, xx, I, p. 60.

^{page 24 note 10} Above, p. 11, n. 6.

^{page 24 note 11} Above, n. 5. Goodspeed, op. cit. pp. 65 f.

^{page 25 note 1} De Spec. Leg. IV, viii, 41–7. See F. H. Colson's trans., VIII (1938), pp. 34–5.Google Scholar

^{page 25 note 2} Since it has been conjectured with much verisimilitude that the questioners were on their way to make payment in the coinage for which Jesus asked.

^{page 26 note 1} See Rom. ii. I. If it is not in the dharmaśāstra it is because there the litigant cannot be a witness in his own cause, and the rules relating to competence of witnesses (p. 20, n. I above) need not be extended to cover the complainant himself: Vācaspati Miśra, Vyavahāracintāmani, ed. Rocher (Ghent, 1956), pp. 189 ff. The point is taken in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure, Act II, sc. I. The Civil-law position on witnesses is set out at length in Bartolus and Nellus respectively in their Tractatus Testimoniorum (in Bartolus Super Authenticis and other editions). Its hostility to tainted accusers is shown in G. Durandus, Speculum Judiciale, and, for example, in Baldi Ubaldi Perusini in [Nonum] Codicis Librum Comm. (Venetiis, 1577), fo. 190v, col. ii (tit. de iis qui accusare non possunt): ‘repelluntur [ab accusando] propter infamiam vitae, periculum participationis, ut excommunicati…, rationem poenalitatis, ut banniti….’

^{page 26 note 2} Mishn. Sotāh i. 1; vi. 3.

^{page 26 note 3} . Sotāh 28a = Sonc. 137–8; 47b = Sonc. 251–2. Becker, p. 59, aptly cites Tar. Onk. for M.T. at Num. v. 31. The connexion between the text of Hosea (iv. 14) which is cited most relevantly in the b.T. (see Sot. 47b, cit. sup.), the history of Sotāh, and our pericope was noticed and understood as long ago as the beginning of this century: see D. W. Amram (cited above), J.E. I, art. ‘Adultery’. Stauffer utilizes the point differently at ‘Neue Wege’ (cited above), P. 469.

^{page 26 note 4} has a defective vāv. See Mid. R. Num. XXI. 3 (Sonc. trans. p. 829, n. 7); Sifre Num. §131 (Kuhn, p. 527; Levertoff, p. 143); Targ. Jer. xli (Etheridge, p. 436).; Pirke d^e R. El. §47.