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Incongruity, Humor, and Mark: Performance and the Use of Laughter in the Second Gospel (Mark 8.14–21)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2012

Kelly R. Iverson*
Affiliation:
Baylor University, Department of Religion, One Bear Place #97284, Waco, TX 76798, USA. email: [email protected].

Abstract

Relatively little scholarly work has attempted to change the perception that the Bible is a non-humorous book. Drawing upon contemporary humor theory, this article explores how Mark's third sea crossing (8.14–21) is intended to evoke a humorous response. Although laughter emerges from the comedic depiction of the Twelve, humor complements the evangelist's broader theological agenda. In Mark, humor is a natural byproduct of performance and is a powerful means of communicating a central theme of the Gospel.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

1 Lefcourt, Herbert M., Humor: The Psychology of Living Buoyantly (The Plenum Series in Social/Clinical Psychology; New York: Kluwer/Plenum, 2000) 53Google Scholar.

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3 ‘Humor’ is notoriously difficult to define and many would describe it as an ‘open concept’. For a discussion of the subject and its many complexities, see Guglielmi, Waltraud, ‘Probleme bei der Anwendung der Begriffe “Komik”, “Ironie”, und “Humor” auf die altägyptischen Literatur’, Göttinger Miszellen 36 (1979) 6985Google Scholar; Twark, Jill E., Humor, Satire, and Identity (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007) 1316CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Attardo, Salvatore, Linguistic Theories of Humor (Humor Research 1; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994) 110Google Scholar. For the purposes of this article, humor is broadly understood as ‘any message—transmitted in action, speech, writing, images or music—intended to produce a smile or a laugh’. See Bremmer, Jan N. and Roodenburg, Herman, ‘Introduction: Humour and History’, A Cultural History of Humour: From Antiquity to the Present Day (ed. Bremmer, Jan N. and Roodenburg, Herman; Cambridge: Polity, 1997) 1Google Scholar.

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7 Halliwell, Stephen, Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Halliwell focuses on the use of ‘laughter’ in the Greco-Roman world and states that he has not attempted ‘to formulate a conception of Greek “humour”’ (ix). It is important to recognize that laughter and humor are not co-terminous, evidenced by the fact that laughter may occur in non-humorous displays of emotion (e.g., greed, triumph, delight). Nevertheless, the two concepts are not unrelated and often correspond quite closely (laughter often being the effect of humor). In this respect, Greek Laughter has much to say about the use of humor in the Greco-Roman world.

8 Halliwell, Greek Laughter, 512, 518.

9 Halliwell, Greek Laughter, 518.

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11 Halliwell, Greek Laughter, 478.

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13 See, for example, Trueblood, Elton, The Humor of Christ (New York: Harper & Row, 1964)Google Scholar; Jónsson, Jakob, Humor and Irony in the New Testament (Reykjavík: Bókaútgáfa Menningarsjóds, 1965)Google Scholar; Radday, Yehuda T. and Brenner, Athalya, eds., On Humour and the Comic in the Hebrew Bible (JSOTSup 92; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1990)Google Scholar; Buckner, Richard, The Joy of Jesus: Humor in the Gospels (Norwich: Canterbury, 1994)Google Scholar; Adams, Douglas, The Prostitute in the Family Tree: Discovering Humor and Irony in the Bible (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997)Google Scholar; Whedbee, J. William, The Bible and the Comic Vision (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998)Google Scholar; Brenner, Athalya, Are We Amused? Humour about Women in the Biblical Worlds (JSOTSup 383; London: T&T Clark, 2003)Google Scholar; Longenecker, Bruce W., ‘A Humorous Jesus? Orality, Structure and Characterisation in Luke 14:15–24, and Beyond’, BibInt 16 (2008) 179204Google Scholar; Darden, Robert, Jesus Laughed: The Redemptive Power of Humor (Nashville: Abingdon, 2008)Google Scholar.

14 Apte, Mahadev L., Humor and Laughter: An Anthropological Approach (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1985)Google Scholar.

15 See the fascinating chapter on ‘Ritual Laughter and the Renewal of Life’ in Halliwell, Greek Laughter, 155–214.

16 Halliwell, Greek Laughter, 157–8.

17 Halliwell, Greek Laughter, 195.

18 Humor research is a burgeoning field marked by a constellation of theories, each with its own points of emphasis and concern. For an introduction to humor theory, see Raskin, Victor, ed., Primer of Humor Research (Humor Research 8; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Raskin, Victor, Semantic Mechanisms of Humor (Synthese Language Library; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985) 47Google Scholar.

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21 For a full discussion of the GTVH, see Attardo, Salvatore and Raskin, Victor, ‘Script Theory Revis(it)ed: Joke Similarity and Joke Representation Model’, Humor 4.3–4 (1991) 293347CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The original discussion of the GTVH focused on short narratives (i.e., jokes), but Attardo has since expanded the theory to describe the characteristics of ‘all humorous texts’, including the features that are unique to longer, non-humorous narratives (see Humorous Texts, 28). In this recent discussion, script opposition remains the most elemental component of the theory.

22 Attardo, Humorous Texts, 26.

23 Attardo, Humorous Texts, 2.

24 Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms of Humor, 99.

25 Veale, Tony (‘Incongruity in Humor: Root Cause or Epiphenomenon?’, Humor 17.4 [2004] 419)CrossRefGoogle Scholar notes that ‘of the few sweeping generalizations one can make about humor that are neither controversial or trivially false, one is surely that humor is a phenomenon that relies on incongruity’. On the centrality of incronguity in humor, see Kant, Immanuel (‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’, Immanuel Kant. Werke in sechs Bänden [ed. Weischedel, Wilhelm; Wiesbaden: Insel, 1957] 5.437)Google Scholar who states: ‘Das Lachen ist ein Affekt aus der plötzlichen Verwandlung einer gespannten Erwartung in nichts’.

26 Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms of Humor, 107–10.

27 Attardo, Humorous Texts, 20.

28 Whereas the genre of traditional, comedic material is defined by a brief introduction followed by a ‘punch line’, longer narratives often contain what Attardo (Humorous Texts, 82) terms ‘jab lines’—‘humorous elements [that are] fully integrated in the narrative in which they appear’. Unlike punch lines, which typically, if not always, occur in the final position, jab lines may appear at any point since ‘they do not disrupt the flow of the narrative, because they either are indispensible to the development of the “plot” or…they are not antagonistic to it’ (Attardo, Humorous Texts, 82–3).

29 For a discussion of how scripts function in longer narratives, see Attardo, Humorous Texts, 38.

30 Although the majority of scholars maintain that the disciples' act of ‘forgetfulness’ indicates a lack of faith, some have argued that the response suggests a form of obduracy intended to thwart Jesus' Gentile ministry. The latter interpretation is advocated by Gibson, Jeffrey B., ‘The Rebuke of the Disciples in Mark 8:14–21’, JSNT 27 (1986) 3147Google Scholar. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the issues, but it should be observed that both interpretations are comedic. Either the disciples are thoroughly confused or so foolishly subversive that their actions are nothing less than stupid and naïve. If the comment in v. 14 indicates that the disciples lacked the wherewithal to prepare for an oft-repeated activity or the confidence to trust in Jesus' ability to provide, the audience can only respond in amusement. Having experienced the power of Mark's narrative in performance, the audience is conscious of Jesus' mighty deeds, including the cleansing of a leper (1.40–44) and the restoration of a paralytic (2.1–12). This, of course, is not to mention the more relevant instances of Jesus ‘violating’ the law in order to ensure that the disciples are well fed (2.23–28), as well as the two feeding episodes in which thousands are satisfied (6.31–44; 8.1–9). On the other hand, if the disciples' response evidences a disposition that is calloused to Jesus' universal mission—a deliberate ploy to ‘forget’ bread so as to avoid becoming participants in the feeding of Gentiles—the scene is no less humorous. Not only have the disciples veered from their calling to be ‘fishers of people’ (1.17), their perspective is so misguided as to think that they can subvert the mission of Jesus, whom the audience knows to be the beloved son (1.11; 9.7; 12.6; 15.39) and agent of God whose work is of divine necessity (δεῖ, 8.31). In either case, though these interpretations suppose different motivations and a slightly different level of cognition, both portray the disciples in a similar fashion.

31 Smith, Stephen H., A Lion with Wings: A Narrative-Critical Approach to Mark's Gospel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1996) 223Google Scholar.

32 Juel, Donald H., The Gospel of Mark (Interpreting Biblical Texts; Nashville: Abingdon, 1999) 75Google Scholar.

33 Painter, John, Mark's Gospel: Worlds in Conflict (New Testament Readings; London: Routledge, 1997) 121Google Scholar.

34 Horsley, Richard A., Hearing the Whole Story: The Politics of Plot in Mark's Gospel (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001) 20Google Scholar.

35 Kingsbury, Jack D., Conflict in Mark: Jesus, Authorities, Disciples (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989) 99Google Scholar.

36 Court, John M., Reading the New Testament (New Testament Readings; London: Routledge, 1997) 154Google Scholar. It should be mentioned that the repeated portrayal of the disciples further enhances the comedic effect. While laughter is often activated through the element of surprise, this is not always the case with narratives of more substantive length. It has been consistently noted that repetition diminishes the humorous effect, but re-iteration plays a vital role in longer narratives. Charney concludes that repetition ‘may be the single most important mechanism in comedy’ (quoted in Attardo, Humorous Texts, 85).

37 For an introduction to the Tractatus Coislinianus, as well as translation, see Cooper, Lane, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy with an Adaptation to the Poetics and a Translation of the ‘Tractatus Coislinianus’ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1924)Google Scholar; Janko, Richard, Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II (London: Duckworth, 1984)Google Scholar.

38 Juel (Mark, 76) suggests that it is important ‘to ask how the disciples will be “played”’ considering that their ‘dullness seems almost unfathomable’. Although Juel acknowledges that the disciples may be ‘simpletons’ or ‘buffoons’, he makes no attempt to consider the use of humor in Mark.

39 Duckworth, George E., The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952) 321–7Google Scholar.

40 Some have argued that v. 15 is an editorial intrusion in the narrative. See, for example, Klostermann, Erich, Das Markusevangelium (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 4th ed. 1950) 87Google Scholar. It would appear that rather than being an intrusion, the comedic development of the scene (i.e., the disciples' response) is dependent upon v. 15.

41 Mark uses the imperfect in 8.16 to emphasize the ongoing nature of the discussion. See BDAG, 232, s.v. διαλογίζομαι; Lohmeyer, Ernst, Das Evangelium des Markus (Meyers Kommentar; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967) 158CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Hooker, Morna D., The Gospel according to Saint Mark (BNTC; London: A & C, 1991) 195Google Scholar. See also Grundmann, Walter, Das Evangelium nach Markus (THKNT 2; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1973) 208Google Scholar.

43 Painter, Mark's Gospel, 122.

44 Some have suggested that the ‘one loaf’ is a symbolic reference to the Eucharist (Ernst, Josef, Das Evangelium nach Markus [RNT; Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1981] 226Google Scholar; Quesnell, Quentin, The Mind of Mark: Interpretation and Method through the Exegesis of Mark 6,52 [AnBib 38; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969] 242–3Google Scholar) or that the ‘one loaf’ refers to Jesus (Boring, M. Eugene, Mark: A Commentary [NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006] 226Google Scholar; Pesch, Rudolf, Das Markusevangelium [2 vols.; HTKNT 2/1–2; Freiburg: Herder, 1976–77] 1.414Google Scholar). Neither conclusion undermines the interpretation offered here.

45 Provine, Robert R., Laughter: A Scientific Investigation (New York: Viking, 2000) 45Google Scholar.

46 Triezenberg, Katrina, ‘Humor Enhancers in the Study of Humorous Literature’, Humor 17.4 (2004) 412–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, emphasis added.

47 A notable exception is Tolbert, Mary Ann (Sowing the Gospel: Mark's World in Literary-Historical Perspective [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989] 102)Google Scholar who states that ‘the irony of the situation is so broad that the reader could find it funny or view the disciples as hopeless dimwits, more suitable to stereotypical roles in New Comedy than disciples of the Messiah’. While perceptive, Tolbert's analysis is limited and makes no attempt to demonstrate how or why humor is used. See also Black, C. Clifton, Mark (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 2011) 186Google Scholar.

48 Smith, A Lion with Wings, 221.

49 Camery-Hoggatt, Jerry, Irony in Mark's Gospel: Text and Subtext (SNTSMS 72; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992) 154CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 Although ‘irony is generally seen as distinct from humor’, there is considerable overlap between the two concepts. See the discussion by Attardo, Salvatore, ‘Humor and Irony in Interaction: From Mode Adaption to Failure of Detection’, Say Not to Say: New Perspectives on Miscommunication (ed. Anolli, Luigi, Ciceri, Rita, and Riva, Giuseppe; Amsterdam: IOS, 2002) 166Google Scholar. This is not to imply that humor and irony are synonymous terms. Some have argued that the mechanisms associated with the concepts are distinct and that irony requires a longer processing time. See Giora, Rachel, ‘On Irony and Negation’, Discourse Processes 19 (1995) 239–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hirsch, Galia, ‘Redundancy, Irony and Humor’, Language Sciences 33 (2011) 316–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the cognitive processing of irony and humor, compare Schwoebel, John, Dews, Shelly, Winner, Ellen, and Srinivas, Kavitha, ‘Obligatory Processing of the Literal Meaning of Ironic Utterances: Further Evidence’, Irony in Language and Thought: A Cognitive Science Reader (ed. Gibbs, Raymond W. and Colston, Herbert L.; New York: Erlbaum, 2007)Google Scholar and Cunningham, William A. and Derks, Peter, ‘Humor Appreciation and Latency of Comprehension’, Humor 18.4 (2005) 389403CrossRefGoogle Scholar. At the very least, a simple distinction between irony and humor remains: irony may or may not be funny, whereas the aim of humor is to invoke a gelatinous response.

51 It is erroneous to assume that humor has a single function in Mark 8. Humor, like all rhetorical techniques, is a complex phenomenon that serves various purposes depending upon the social and performative context. For instance, humor creates rapport between an audience and performer, interjects emotional variation, and facilitates narrative retention. All these functions likely play a role in 8.14–21. For further discussion on the uses of humor, see Roeckelein, Jon E., The Psychology of Humor: A Reference Guide and Annotated Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002)Google Scholar; Gervais, Matthew and Wilson, David Sloan, ‘The Evolution and Functions of Laughter and Humor: A Synthetic Approach’, The Quarterly Review of Biology 80.4 (2005) 395430CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Martin, Psychology of Humor, 113–50. On the intersection between humor and memory, see Carlson, Keith A., ‘The Impact of Humor on Memory: Is the Humor Effect about Humor?’, Humor 24.1 (2011) 2141CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schmidt, Stephen R., ‘Effects of Humor on Sentence Memory’, Journal of Experimental Psychology 20.4 (1994) 953–67Google ScholarPubMed.

52 See, for example, Morreall, John, Comic Relief: A Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Because laughter often derives from the ridicule of others, some have suggested that humor is an anti-social phenomenon. This connotation is well documented, but other proponents of the theory have posited a more benign perspective, likening humor to a type of play or game that results in ‘fun, leisure, entertainment, recreation, [and] affable human interaction’ (Gruner, Charles R., The Game of Humor: A Comprehensive Theory of Why We Laugh [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997] 2Google Scholar). In this vein, some have called for a reevaluation of Plato's view of humor (Shelley, Cameron, ‘Plato on the Psychology of Humor’, Humor 16.4 [2003] 351–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

53 Because of its cathartic function, some have compared laughter to other phenomena such as orgasm and weeping. See, for example, Plessner, Helmuth, ‘Das Lächeln’, Mit anderen Augen. Aspekte einer philosophischen Anthropologie (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982) 185Google Scholar. For a review of the theory, as well as further literature on the subject, see Lefcourt, Humor, 35–9. Perhaps the most widely recognized figure associated with the theory is Freud, Sigmund (Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious [Leipzig: Deuticke, 1905])Google Scholar.

54 Already in the thirteenth century, Henri de Mondeville was advising fellow physicians in their post-operative care to ‘forbid anger, hatred, and sadness in the patient, and remind him that the body grows fat from joy and thin from sadness’ (quoted in Lefcourt, Humor, 37). Some of the particularities of the theory have been clarified, but modern research has largely substantiated the intrinsic value and psychological benefits of laughter.

55 Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms of Humor, 40. A similar perspective is adopted by Lynch, Owen H., ‘Humorous Communication: Finding a Place for Humor in Communication Research’, Communication Theory 12.4 (2002) 423–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 On the strategic location of the scene, see LaVerdiere, Eugene, The Beginning of the Gospel: Introducing the Gospel according to Mark (2 vols.; Collegeville: Liturgical, 1999) 1.213Google Scholar; Harrington, Wilfrid J., Mark: Realistic Theologian: The Jesus of Mark (Dublin: Columbia, 2002) 105Google Scholar.

57 Weeden, Theodore J., ‘The Heresy that Necessitated Mark's Gospel’, The Interpretation of Mark (ed. Telford, William R.; Issues in Religion and Theology 7; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995) 66Google Scholar; see also Crossan, John Dominic, ‘Mark and the Relatives of Jesus’, NovT 15 (1973) 81113Google Scholar; Kelber, Werner H., The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983)Google Scholar.

58 Williams, Joel F., Other Followers of Jesus: Minor Characters as Major Figures in Mark's Gospel (JSNTSup 102; Sheffield: JSOT, 1994) 148Google Scholar; Tannehill, Robert C., ‘The Disciples in Mark: The Function of a Narrative Role’, in Telford (ed.), The Interpretation of Mark, 184–5Google Scholar.

59 Shiner, Whitney Taylor, Proclaiming the Gospel: First-Century Performance of Mark (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003) 4Google Scholar.

60 The phrase ‘let the reader understand’ does not imply the kind of silent reading that is often inferred. As Shiner observes (Proclaiming the Gospel, 177), a ‘“reader” in the ancient world often meant those listening to someone else performing a work of literature’. Even among the literate, private reading was typically vocalized (cf. Acts 8.29–30).

61 Giles, Terry and Doan, William J., Twice Used Songs: Performance Criticism of the Songs of Ancient Israel (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2009) 21–2Google Scholar; Ruge-Jones, Philip, ‘Omnipresent, Not Omniscient: How Literary Interpretation Confuses the Storyteller's Narrating’, Between Author and Audience in Mark: Narration, Characterization, Interpretation (ed. Elizabeth Struthers Malbon; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2009) 35–6Google Scholar.

62 Boomershine, Thomas E., ‘Audience Address and Purpose in the Performance of Mark’, Mark as Story: Retrospect and Prospect (ed. Iverson, Kelly R. and Skinner, Christopher W.; Atlanta: SBL, 2011) 124Google Scholar.

63 See Boomershine, ‘Audience Address’, 125–8.

64 Lee, Margaret Ellen and Scott, Bernard Brandon, Sound Mapping the New Testament (Salem: Polebridge, 2009) 108–11Google Scholar. As Boomershine observes (‘Audience Address’, 124), audience identification ‘increases in its experiential impact in correlation with the length of the speech. The longer Jesus addresses the audience as a particular character, the more deeply the audience identifies with and “becomes” that character.’

65 Communicating with an audience through the narrative is a seasoned practice in both ancient and modern performance. Juvenal's fifth satire, for example, describes a rich man's feast at which the least of the elite guests is made to play the role of the destitute. However, as the man endures the host's abuse and becomes the focal point of the guests' comedic enjoyment, there is more going on than meets the eye. Freudenburg, Kirk (Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to Juvenal [Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001])CrossRefGoogle Scholar suggests that despite the laughter evoked at the expense of the ‘poor’ man, the question Juvenal addresses is more significant and thrust back upon the audience: ‘where do we place ourselves in these scenes?… Do we laugh at his [the poor man's] failures…or do we see his show as tragic and true’? (269–70) Similar to Mark, Juvenal uses the portrayal of the character to engage an issue/attitude in the lives of his audience. In performance, this kind of direct engagement is facilitated through an off-stage focus. See, for example, the performance of Mark by Max McLean (http://www.youtube.com/user/MarksGospelOnStage?feature=watch). During the third sea crossing, as well as at other points in the narrative, the performer (McLean) looks directly into the camera to engage the audience.

66 Quintilian (6.3.19) goes on to describe humor as a kind of verbal ‘salt’. When used appropriately, humor acts as a ‘natural seasoning’ that enlivens discourse and stimulates audience interest.

67 Joeckel, Samuel, ‘Funny as Hell: Christianity and Humor Reconsidered’, Humor 21.4 (2008) 415–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Joeckel argues that humor has a spatial effect that draws an audience into closer proximity with the events of the story. Citing Bakhtin, who notes that ‘laughter has the remarkable power of making an object come up close’, Joeckel (424) suggests that laughter actualizes the narrative in order to make it assessable, delivering it from the ‘enshrined immutability’ of the past. Rather than being ‘immunized from the flux of contemporary experience, and thus irrevocably demarcated from the present’, laughter subtly repositions the audience, fostering a disposition that is ‘conducive to authentic analysis’ (424). In certain contexts, humor helps to prepare one's cognitive faculties and functions ‘as a sort of epistemological preconditionalism’ (525). See also Eastman, Max, The Sense of Humor (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921; repr. New York: Octagon, 1972) 42–8Google Scholar.

68 Saroglou, Vassilis, ‘Religion and Sense of Humor: An a Priori Incompatibility? Theoretical Considerations from a Psychological Perspective’, Humor 15.2 (2002) 191214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69 Baudelaire, Charles, ‘On the Essence of Laughter, and, in General, on the Comic in the Plastic Arts’, Comedy: Meaning and Form (ed. Corrigan, Robert W.; San Francisco: Chandler, 1965) 455Google Scholar.