The philosophical anthropology of the twentieth-century French Catholic philosopher Maurice Blondel has had a significant impact on modern and contemporary theology. However, Blondel's less well-known idea of tradition in the text History and Dogma remains to be adequately assessed by the English-speaking world. In order to appreciate Blondel's contribution to the idea of tradition in modern Catholicism and to discover how his thought remains a rich resource for contemporary theology, this essay traces the shifts in late-medieval theological discourse that reveal a gradual move toward conceptualizing tradition as a bureaucratic reality mediated through institutional and juridical means which comes to full expression during the modernist crisis in the Roman Catholic Church. Having situated Blondel's thought within the historical and theological development of the modern idea of tradition in Catholicism, the essay argues that Blondel offers an alternative account of tradition as ‘liturgical action,’ which vivifies Christ's sacramental presence in tradition and resists reducing tradition to a bureaucratic reality or a natural phenomenon.

Thomas Aquinas has a philosophy of education. In this article I try to indicate what it amounts to by focusing not only on his theoretical discussions of teaching and learning but also on what can be gleaned about his approach to teaching by looking at his own teaching practice as displayed in some of his writings. In addition, I look at two of Aquinas's sermons that shed light on what he thinks about teaching and learning.

In the second half of the twentieth century Josef Fuchs put forward a major re-visioning of the natural law, but this re-visioning did not include a robust social ethic. In this paper the author first undertakes an explication of the development, context, and major features of Fuchs’ theory. Next, in order to locate it within other twentieth century developments in natural law theory, Fuchs’ theory is related to Jacques Maritain's re-visioning of natural law, with its clear social-ethical implications. Finally, the author draws out some of the potential implications and applications of Fuchs’ revised natural law for social ethics.

Augustine and Aquinas are points of reference in the so-called “culture wars” about how Christianity should think of its relation to modern liberal culture. “Postmodern Augustinian Thomists” (PATs) appeal to Augustine for their choice of a dialectical relation to liberalism, and those nicknamed “Whig Thomists” are more ready to see an alignment between liberal democratic capitalism and Aquinas’ view of politics. In this paper, some points relating to how Augustine thinks of “the City of God” form the basis of a consideration of the way PATs argue for their position.

The work of Herbert McCabe offers a model for thinking about the world and human life in it that has yet to be fully appreciated. In this essay, I argue that McCabe's linguistic model provides invaluable insight into human communication and the moral life, showing the natural law to be more like scaffolding than a list of stipulations.

In this article I argue that Rahner's notion of the Supernatural Existential serves to complement and more concretely illustrate Taylor's at-times tacit, if conflicted, advocacy for some sort of human characteristic that seeks, desires, or is otherwise oriented toward something ‘beyond human flourishing.' By engaging Rahner's theological anthropology with Taylor's thought in ‘A Secular Age,' I show how Taylor's immanent and transcendent divide presupposes an overly cognitive framework that relies extensively on human agency, thematic reflection, and the necessary intellectualization of human experience. As such, Taylor only ever engages in a secondary-level or a posteriori reflection on belief and unbelief, thereby (perhaps unwittingly) precluding the possibility of considering the a priori ‘condition' for his proposed ‘conditions for belief or unbelief,' otherwise known as ‘secularity 3.' In uncovering the secondary-level cognitive conditions for categorical belief and unbelief today, helps shed new light on the relevance and value of Rahner's project. Furthermore, I suggest that both Rahner and Taylor, although maybe not immediately recognizable, actually share similar concerns that initially launched their respective projects. Read together, Rahner and Taylor offer a fuller treatment of both the human condition and the social circumstances of this age.

St Augustine has been the most influential single voice in the history of western Christianity. Those in quest of a new theology often find it necessary to begin by criticizing him. This is fair enough; but a Christianity conscious of its past cannot discard him. This is clear in ecumenical dialogue with the Churches of the Reformation: their theology is hugely indebted to Augustine, and dialogue between them and Catholics must often return to him as their common source. Augustine lived in an age, like our own, where Christian values were not dominant in society, and where a Christian active in society had to show readiness to compromise in order to maximize the common good. To this we can relate his teaching on sexuality, where he accepted that the Church had to tolerate sexual behaviour within marriage that did not satisfy the strict letter of Christian morality but was often necessary for marital harmony. Here again was an area where the Church had to recognize a secular sphere with its own character and needs. Augustine's teaching on the prime importance of harmony in society went together with a lack of belief in human progress that contrasts sharply with the recent teaching of Gaudium et spes; but it is the latter that, fifty years after the Council, begins to look dated. The Church must maintain a constant dialogue with tradition. Within that tradition Augustine's place cannot be contested.

In Love Alone is Credible (1963), Hans Urs von Balthasar discusses love in a way that “seeks to be faithful to the theological tradition of the great saints.” Conspicuously missing from the set of “great saints” whom Balthasar praises is Thomas Aquinas. Does Balthasar imply a negative judgment about Thomas's thought on love? If so, what is the judgment? On what grounds is it made? How might Thomas answer? To address these questions, I construct a dialogue between the two, privileging Love Alone and the Questions on charity from the Summa Theologiae. The dialogue begins with a survey of ground common to Balthasar and Thomas. A second step shows how three salient aspects of Thomas's treatment of charity appear from Balthasar's perspective. A third section deepens the critique, showing that for Balthasar, both divine and human love must be conceived as utterly gratuitous in ways that Thomas downplays or denies. A fourth section asks how the account of love given by Balthasar appears from Thomas's viewpoint. A final section asks what to make of these partly overlapping, partly clashing perspectives, and suggests why both are necessary.

Joseph Ratzinger and Alexander Schmemann, representing West and East respectively, share similar views of personhood and freedom. This similarity is evidenced both in their constructive construal of Christian freedom, and their destructive dismantling of secular freedom. According to both theologians, Christian freedom is grounded in a relational anthropology in which the human person images God's relational freedom as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In contrast, secular understandings of freedom place freedom in antinomic relationship with authority. In other words, Christian freedom is ontological, and secular freedom is ‘external’. There are differences between Ratzinger and Schmemann, yet the differences do not divide. This essay concludes that their various emphases are brought together via the three-fold office of Christ—prophet, priest, and king—to provide a robust and ecumenical expression of Christian freedom.

Capitalizing on the diversity of ways in which the phrase “the end of ethics” can be interpreted, this article explores how, from a Thomistic perspective, the virtue of prudence might be considered the “end” of ethics. After bringing to light certain problematic aspects of the relationship between ethics and prudence, it is argued that Aquinas’ understanding of the intellectual virtues allows for a clear line to be drawn between the two. In this way, it is possible to say where ethics “ends” and prudence begins. This answer, however, seems to raise a further difficulty which, upon resolution, reveals a sense in which prudence is also the “end” of ethics when “end” is taken to mean its goal.