For twelve of the years during which he spent a semester lecturing as a visiting professor at the Gregorian University (Rome), Frederick Copleston enjoyed close contacts with Bernard Lonergan. He was one of the two ‘house’ censors of Insight. He also wrote a very positive review of the book for the Oxford-based Journal of Theological Studies, which was then co-edited by Henry Chadwick. The personal and professional contacts between Copleston and Lonergan have been widely neglected; they call for further study and evaluation.

In this paper I argue that Heidegger's critique of Aquinas on truth must be seen in light of Vallicella's critique of Heidegger. Heidegger criticized Aquinas for allegedly placing truth in the ‘subjectivity’ of the human mind via correspondence (adequatio). While the accuracy of this reading of Aquinas is highly contested, the criticism itself has sometimes been turned back upon Heidegger. In three forgotten articles in the 1980s, William Vallicella contended that Heidegger reduces Being to truth, and truth to the alleged ‘subjectivity’ of Dasein. Though Vallicella garnered some minimal attention at the time, his argument was soon forgotten, along with its potential implications for Heidegger's criticism of Aquinas. This paper will first establish the nature of Heidegger's critique of Aquinas, followed by Vallicella's critique of Heidegger, evaluating the former in light of the latter. It will be shown that Heidegger critiques Thomas for a mistake he does not make, then makes that same mistake himself, only to retreat to a position similar to what Thomas actually holds, but in a way that solves nothing, for he lacks Thomas’ anchor in a divine mind. These points will coalesce in the ultimate conclusion that Vallicella can be used to both undermine Heidegger's critique and undergird the value of Aquinas’ position on truth.

Graham Greene's Monsignor Quixote illustrates an ecclesiology of friendship through the title character's relationship with Sancho. Quixote is depicted as a holy fool, who is able to bring his companero back to the faith by his open mutual mediation with him. Greene has not strayed from orthodoxy, but has developed his theology compared to his earlier novels

Theorists with strongly communal understandings of the common good frequently criticize the modern liberal state for failing to provide for the common good and for interfering with local communities. These critics, however, are less clear about what role, if any, the state should play in modern life. In order to trace a middle ground between liberal attempts to justify the state and too hasty communitarian condemnations of it, I develop a two-tiered theory of political justification. All political justification is to be seen in relationship to the common good of a community. While only local communities have a common good and a direct claim to political authority, the state can still have an indirect and derivative authority. After examining how this theory applies to thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Charles Taylor, I propose an appropriate model for the relationship between local communities and the state.

Whilst philosophers have argued that musical experience provides evidence for theism, their discussions often fail to consider the aesthetic properties which give musical experience its distinctive character, or ways in which musical experience might support the beliefs of particular religious traditions. This paper begins to remedy this omission by examining how attention to liturgical music can provide rational support for Christian faith. I first explore music's emotional nature and impact, and its ability to embody Christian narratives and doctrines. In light of this discussion, I then introduce two probabilistic arguments for the truth of Christian orthodoxy, arguing that liturgical music can provide distinctive evidence for their premises.

This essay purports to discuss some of Pope Francis's ambiguities. It is divided into seven sections. I present his background. I acknowledge the significance of his message of mercy and, based on Bernard Lonergan and Ladislas Örsy, I show how mercy ought to be wisely practised. I discuss Francis's Bergsonian epistemology, which I deem inadequate. I deplore his ambiguities about uncertainty. I then proceed to detail two impasses, which he has not overcome, at least until now: the possibility of ordaining women to the priesthood and the possibility of admitting Gays and Lesbians to eucharistic communion. I finally conclude with an appeal to a constructive and critical dialogue.