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Philosophy in the Light of Incarnation Gianni Vattimo on kenosis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Ulrich Engel OP*
Affiliation:
Institut M.-Dominique Chenu, Schwedter Strasse 23, D-10119 Berlin
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Abstract

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The author 2008. Journal compilation © The Dominican Council/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008

Only in the light of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of the son of God does it seem possible for philosophy to think of itself as a reading of the signs of the times without this being reduced to a purely passive record of the times. ‘In the light’ of the Incarnation is once again an expression that seeks to capture a problematic and unresolved relation that lies at the very heart of the experience of event-likeness: the incarnation of God at issue here is not simply a way of giving mythical expression to what philosophy will in the end reveal via rational enquiry. (…) If you will: it is the fact of the Incarnation that confers on history the sense of a redemptive revelation, as opposed to a confused accumulation of happenings that unsettle the pure structural quality of true Being.Footnote 1

The person who is thinking philosophy and theology together in the way quoted here is the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo. Vattimo was born in 1936 in Torino. He studied, inter alia, under Luigi Pareyson (1918-1991)Footnote 2 and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). From 1964 until 1982 Vattimo was Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Torino; since 1982 he has been teaching theoretical philosophy at the same university. In 1981 he was a visiting professor at Yale University, and also taught in New York and California. Vattimo is the editor of the “Revista di Estetica” (Magazine of Aesthetics). Since 1999 he has been a Member of the European Parliament for the “Partito dei Democratici di Sinistra” (Party of Left Democracy).

Gianni Vattimo counts as one of the leading theoreticians of the so-called “post-modern” age, alongside Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida.Footnote 3 It is possible to sketch his philosophy as follows, in a short summaryFootnote 4: Vattimo believes that the modern, Enlightenment project of human emancipation as the unfolding of reason through the self-conscious appropriation of nature and the rational organization of society, has been undermined by the effects of new technology and the mass media upon contemporary societies. These developments have produced a complex and fragmented world, in which the continual elaboration of numerous heterogeneous interpretative schemata has removed the possibility of any privileged or ‘objective’ point of view upon which to build a unitary or progressive conception of human history. He argues that this situation produces a ‘weak ontology’ that demands a corresponding weakening of philosophy's traditional metaphysical aspirations in the direction of ‘weak thought’ (pensiero debole), an approach he associates with the notions of nihilism and difference elaborated by Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger.

In his most recent publications, Vattimo concerns himself expressly with the Christian religion as it has been handed down. The most important of these are:

1996: the book Credere di credere Footnote 5 (English: Belief, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press),
1996: the essay La trace de la trace Footnote 6 (English: The Trace of the Trace, in: Religion, ed. by J. Derrida / G. Vattimo, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 1998, p. 79-94),
2002: the Berlin Lecture Christentum im Zeitalter der Interpretation Footnote 7 (Christianity in the Age of Interpretation).

I have divided my lecture into three sections:

The ‘weak thought’ (I).
The ‘weak thought” and Christianity (II).
Theological appreciation (III)

I. The ‘weak thought’

Vattimo's starting point is his conviction that the belief in strong principles and fixed structures has become obsolete with the end of the modern age. The Italian philosopher Fabrizia Giacobbe OP describes this as follows: “the dissolution of the stability of being, i.e. the questioning of the concept of being as the ground and of thinking as the means of access to the ground, one of the typical themes of philosophy in the 20th century, is an important assumption (…) of ‘weak thinking’”Footnote 8. The distinguishing marks of the post-modern age are, looked at from an ontological point of view, the negation of the stable structures of being. Looked at from an epistemological point of view, they are the end of all “matching” truth, whereby knowledge consists of the correct matching of the subject with the object: “veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus” (“Truth is the matching of reality and mind”, Thomas AquinasFootnote 9).

Vattimo is quite fundamentally related to Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Despite the differences between the philosophical approach of Nietzsche and Heidegger, both of them, however, fundamentally call into question the traditional Western thinking. Vattimo is convinced that the announcement of the death of GodFootnote 10 by Nietzsche's fearless man can be identified with the end of metaphysics which Heidegger speaks of. Both aspects together –the death of God and the end of metaphysics– constitute, according to Vattimo, the core content of the post-modern age. “Vattimo takes over Nietzsche's insight that belief in (objective) truth has diminished, and Heidegger's historical-philosophical idea of a history of being [Seinsgeschichte; lecturer's note], which he understands as a history of dissolution”Footnote 11. Just as for Nietzsche, so for Vattimo also, the ‘real world’ has become a fable.Footnote 12 The ‘real world’ has been abolished; reality only continues to exist as (current personal) interpretation. The objective reality of metaphysics has had it. In place of thinking, which is orientated towards ‘strong’ principles, we now have, according to Vattimo, ‘weak thinking’, the free play of interpretations. This weakening tendency, which, according to Vattimo, is roaming through the whole of Western history (of metaphysics), has reached its completion in the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Vattimo characterises this “history of the collapse of being as conceived as an object”Footnote 13 in Nietzsche's terminology, as “the history of nihilism”Footnote 14.

Following on from that, Vattimo's ‘weak thinking’ can be characterised as philosophical hermeneutics: i.e. as philosophy of interpretation. Everything is interpretation. In this context, we must be careful, of course, not to (mis-)understand the thesis of the hermeneutics practitioners that there are no facts but only interpretations (cf. F. Nietzsche: “there are no facts, only interpretations”Footnote 15) so as to make it into an objective, metaphysical statement again. For “the statement, that there are only interpretations, is itself ‘only’ an interpretation”Footnote 16.

Often, the question is asked whether such a hermeneutical conception of truth does not merely lead to relativism. To refute this suspicion, it is necessary, according to Giacobbe, “to remember that the horizon within which the world reveals itself at any particular time to historical mankind is not a stable structure but is an event. (…) The historical horizon is (…) not a foundation or a stable structure (…) It [i.e. the truth, lecturer's note] has the appearance rather more of a chain of references, i.e. as a historical tradition already”Footnote 17. So the philosophy of the post-modern age (in both senses of the genitive case) legitimises itself only through its historical continuity. Vattimo wrote the following about this:

What the practitioner of hermeneutics offers as a ‘proof’ of his own theory is a history, not only in the sense of res gestae but also in the sense of historia rerum gestarum, and perhaps also even in the sense of a ‘fable’ or a myth, because it presents itself as an interpretation (which only claims validity until a competing interpretation refutes it), and not as an objective description of factsFootnote 18.

II. ‘Weak thinking’ and Christianity

The history of nihilism, understood as the history of the weakening of strong principles, begins, as Vattimo is convinced, with the advent of Christianity. And it owes a lot to the Christian religion. Vattimo writes:

Modern philosophical hermeneutics arose in Europe not only because there is a book religion here, which attracted attention towards the phenomenon of interpretation, but also because the idea of the incarnation of God lies at the heart of this religion, an idea understood as kenosis, as humiliation, and, as we would translate it, as weakening.Footnote 19

Vattimo recognises kenosis as the central characteristic of Christianity (with reference to the Letter to the Philippians 2,7Footnote 20). For him, “the incarnation, that is, God's abasement to the level of humanity [better still: humiliation; lecturer's note], what the New Testament calls God's kenosis”Footnote 21, marks out the beginning of the process of secularization. Vattimo reads the history of religion as a history of advancing desacralization, in other words secularization. With the end of metaphysics, the end of the metaphysical idea of God, inseparable from it, has been rung in. Accordingly, Vattimo interprets the Christian dogma of the incarnation as the outstanding moment in the process of secularization.

On the other hand, one consequence of this is that Vattimo interprets philosophical hermeneutics as a secularized form of Christian kenosis. In Oltre l'interpretazione (Beyond Interpretation) he writes:

Kenosis, which takes place in the incarnation of God and ultimately in the secularization and in the weakening of being and its strong structures (going as far as the dissolution of the ideal of objectively understood truth) [occurs] because of a ‘law’ of religion, at least in the sense that it is not the subject who decides to surrender himself to a process of stripping himself and endless annihilation, but he is called to this surrender by the ‘thing itself’. The idea which dominates hermeneutics, that of the interpreter belonging to the thing which is to be interpreted, or, more generally, to the game of interpretation, reflects this experience of transcendence, expresses it, repeats and interprets it.Footnote 22

According to Vattimo's thesis, the process of kenotic secularization flows into Christian charity (caritas): “(…) the essence of revelation is reduced to charity”Footnote 23. The limit of nihilism is the charity which is grounded in the Christian double commandment. Christianity recovered as the doctrine of salvation (namely, secularizing kenosis) provides a critical priciple which is sufficiently clear to allow one to orient oneself in relation to the world, to the church and also to the process of secularization.Footnote 24“If one respond to the question concerning the ‘limit’ of secularization, this critical principle can be clarified.”Footnote 25

In his book Credere di credere Vattimo writes:

If one thinks of nihilism as an infinite history in terms of the religious ‘text’ that is its basis and inspiration, it will speak of kenosis as guided, limited and endowed with meaning, by God's love. The precept ‘Dilige, et quod vis fac’ (‘Love, and do what you will’), found in the work of t Augustine, expresses clearly the only criterion on the basis of which secularization must be examined.Footnote 26

Vattimo finds his thesis confirmed by the connection between kenosis and secularization in “the actual ways in which the return of the religious occurs in the present day”Footnote 27. One of the most striking forms of this return is “the return of (the plausibility of) religion in philosophy today”Footnote 28. Vattimo explains this phenomenon as follows:

“It is (only) because metaphysical meta-narratives have been dissolved that philosophy has rediscovered the plausibility of religion and can consequently approach the religious need of common consciousness independently of the framework of Enlightenment critique.”Footnote 29

The experience of the return of the religious refers us anew to the moment of historicity (already mentioned above), or, theologically speaking, to tradition. This is given to us – philosophically speaking – in “myth”. Vattimo refers to his teacher, Luigi Pareyson (already mentioned above) in his description of what he understands by “myth”. In The Trace of the Trace I read:

“Pareyson's reflection on religious experience and its connection with myth (…) is of the highest importance here (…). The term myth, moreover, stands here as an emblem of all that is positive in both senses of the one word. It is the place in which is given a historicity that is at once radical and (precisely for this reason) irreducible to the immanence of worldly historicity.”Footnote 30

There is another aspect which is immanent in religion which is closely connected to myth as described above, namely “the irruption of the ‘Other’”Footnote 31. In this connection, however, it is certainly not the case that this “discontinuity in the horizontal course of history”Footnote 32 negates the historicity of becoming.

The historicity that we find in myth is – speaking theologically now – at the same time “already” as well as “not yet”, incarnated as well as transcendent, in time as well as beyond time. This doubly positive contents of historically constituted religion is also intrinsic to the Jewish-Christian belief in God. It “appears for us as a given through tradition, in whose history of influence we are always involved already”Footnote 33. This tradition does not, however, stand unchanged once and for all, but has been subject from time immemorial as regards its contents to a mediating exegesis, in other words, to interpretation. In this connection, I quote once again from Vattimo's essay The Trace of the Trace:

We “experience the return of the religious in a world in which one cannot ignore the history of influence of every text, and of the biblical text above all. One cannot ignore the fact that the sacred texts which mark our religious experience are handed down to us by a tradition, by which I mean also that its mediation does not allow them to survive as unmodifiable objects (…). Beginning with St Augustine and his reflection on the Trinity, Christian theology is in its deepest foundations a hermeneutic theology: the interpretative structure, transmission, mediation and, perhaps, the fallenness do not concern only the enunciation, the communication of God with man; they characterize the intimate life of God itself, which therefore cannot be conceived in terms of an immutable metaphysical plenitude”.Footnote 34

The interpretation has to orientate itself towards the “signs of the times”. By using this phrase, “signs of the times”, Vattimo falls back on the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes of the Second Vatican Council. In that, the Church has the duty of „scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel” (No. 4). The signs of the times form the criterion for interpretation:

„all that time, the existential temporality characteristic of man, points towards is the eternity of God (…) Only in the light of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of the son of God does it seem possible for philosophy to think itself as a reading of the signs of the times without this being reduced to a purely passive record of the times.”Footnote 35

III. Theological appreciation

With the last quotation, I have returned again to the starting-point of my lecture. I would not, however, like to finish without, with the required brevity (and, therefore, incompletely), adding a few words about the theological appreciation of Vattimo's philosophical reflections. I formulate nine theses about thisFootnote 36:

  1. 1. Vattimo calls himself a “half-believer”.Footnote 37 He proves to be a religious searcher – even where he follows Nietzsche by talking about “the death of God”. In this connection, I am reminded of Martin Heidegger, who ended his essay about “Nietzsche's phrase ‘God is dead’”Footnote 38 with the hint that the ‘fearless man’ who announces the death of God, is searching for him – God – at the same time.

  2. 2. Vattimo tries to rethink Christian “revelation in secularized terms”Footnote 39. In this connection, he succeeds in making basic data of the Christian tradition accessible to the post-modern discourse.

  3. 3. Vattimo respects (Christian) tradition, which can never be surmounted as the moment of our historical composition. At the same time, he protects this tradition from every sort of ossification, in understanding it as a tradition which is always open to new interpretations. In doing this, he holds a mirror of criticism in front of some Church authorities, who have become ossified on certain questions.

  4. 4. In way of thinking similar to Hans Blumenberg, Vattimo succeeds in considering the process of secularization in both of its main aspects: as “quantitative decline”Footnote 40 and as the epitome of “qualitative reshaping”Footnote 41– as a quantitative reduction where he indicates the declining influence of Church authority, and as qualitative transformation where he develops the idea of “‘secularization’ as the constitutive trait of an authentic religious experience”.Footnote 42

  5. 5. Vattimo redefines the relationship between religion and philosophy. “The positive function which religion has for contemporary philosophy does not at all consist in throwing the lifebelt of eternal truth to the unfoundedness of post-modern thought, which the encyclical Fides et Ratio still tries to do”.Footnote 43 Rather, the forward-looking contribution of religion (understood as that sphere which expressly takes the radical dependence of being on events [Ereignishaftigkeit des Seins; lecturer's note]‘as its theme’) consists in helping philosophy to take its own hermeneutical constitution and, along with that, its historicity seriously.Footnote 44

  6. 6. Even in some places it seems as if Vattimo is throwing out the baby – God – with the bathwater – the strong principle of metaphysics –, nevertheless, if we look closer, we see that he does distinguish between being on the one hand and God on the other hand, insofar as he thinks of kenosis, then, not “as the indefinite negation of God”.Footnote 45 The dividing line is the “charity”Footnote 46(caritas) which is grounded in the Christian double commandment, it is the “kernel”Footnote 47 which it is not possible to get behind.Footnote 48

  7. 7. Is the ‘weak thinking’ led to pray to God or to Jesus Christ? I am convinced, because I am agree with the argumentation of Vattimo: “To be sure, turning to God in prayer entail something more, that is, a conception of the divine person. (…) Accordingly, when I pray – since I pray in the most traditional manner, mainly by reciting the psalms and other prayers of the Roman breviary – I am aware that I am not merely acting on the basic of a philosophical persuasion, but am going a step further. (…) Then, the dissolution of metaphysical reason, of its claim to grasp true Being once and for all, allows me also to accept a measure of ‘myth’ in my life, which need not necessarily be translated in rational terms – ultimately reason too must be secularized in the name of charity”.Footnote 49

  8. 8. I am not agree with Vattimo's interpretation of the Old/First Testament. I am convinced, that we can not read the history of religion as a one-dimensional history of advancing desacralization. There are more differences inside the Jewish religion than Vattimo thinks (cf. the hermeneutical reading of the bible in the cabbalistic tradition; the different forms of ‘Jewish enlightment’ in the books of Job and Wisdom; the prohibition of Divine Images according the second commandment to the Old Testament etc.).

  9. 9. Nevertheless, Vattimo's ‘weak thinking’ is compatible with the traditions of Christianity. A (half-) believing worldview, which trusts in the incarnation of God in this world and in this age, does not need any metaphysics of the Heidegger variety. A ‘weak ontology’, which empowers us as human beings to experience ourselves as existing and, therefore, also as mortal, is fully sufficient.Footnote 50 I am convinced about that.

Footnotes

*

Lecture in St. Stephen's House, Oxford, UK, 24 July 2002 (Conference “Illumination: reason, revelation and science”, 23-26 July 2002).

References

1 Religion, ed. by Derrida, J. and Vattimo, G., translated by Geiger, J., Weber, S. and Webb, D., Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 1998, p. 92Google Scholar.

2 Cf. Weiß, M., Pareyson, Luigi, in: Bio-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon, vol. 14, Herzeberg: Verlag Traugott Bautz 1998, col. 1339-1353.Google Scholar

3 Cf. M. Weiß, Gianni Vattimo. Eine Einführung. Mit einem Interview im Anhang, Vienna: Passagen Verlag 2003.

5 G. Vattino, Credere di credere, Milano: Garzanti Editore 1996.

6 G. Vattimo, La trace de la trace, in: La religion, ed. by J. Derrida and G. Vattimo, Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1996, p. 87-104.

7 A shortened version of the lecture was recently published: G. Vattimo, Wirklichkeit, wo ist deine Wahrheit? Christentum im Zeitalter der Interpretation, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung No. 136 (15 and 16/06/2002), p. 61 (International Edition) resp. p. 77 (Swiss Edition). The complete text is published in: G. Vattimo / R. Schröder / U. Engel, Christentum im Zeitalter der Interpretation, ed. by Th. Eggensperger (Passagen Forum), Vienna: Passagen Verlag Wien 2004, p. 17–32.

8 F. Giacobbe, Das ”schwache Denken“ Gianni Vattimos und die Wahrheitsfrage, in: Wahrheit. Recherchen zwischen Hochscholastik und Postmoderne, ed. by Th. Eggensperger and U. Engel (WSAMA.P vol. 9), Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag 1995, p. 116-129, here 116.

9 S.Th. I 16,1c.

10 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, in: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. by G. Colli / M. Montinari, vol. 3, Munich: DTV Neuausgabe 1999, p. 343-651, here 480-482.

11 M. Weiß, Die Religion der Schwäche. Gianni Vattimos Interpretation des Christentums im Kontext des Schwachen Denkens, in: Essays zu Jacques Derrida und Gianni Vattimo, ”Religion“, ed. by L. Nagl, Frankfurt/M. i.a.: Peter Lang Verlag 2001, p. 145-167, here 148.

12 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, in: Kritische Studienausgabe, ibid., vol. 6, p. 55-163, here 80f.

13 M. Weiß, Die Religion der Schwäche, ibid., p. 148.

14 G. Vattimo, Jenseits der Interpretation. Die Bedeutung der Hermeneutik für die Philosophie (Edition Pandora vol. 36 / Europäische Vorlesungen vol. 8), Frankfurt/M. – New York: Campus Verlag 1997, p. 25.

15 Vgl. F. Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, in: Kritische Studienausgabe, ibid., vol. 12, p. 315.

16 G. Vattimo, Wirklichkeit, wo ist deine Wahrheit?, ibid.

17 F. Giacobbe, Das ”schwache Denken“ Gianni Vattimos und die Wahrheitsfrage, ibid., p. 125 (my italics).

18 G. Vattimo, Jenseits der Interpretation, ibid., p. 25.

19 Ibid., p. 75.

20 Cf. G. Vattimo, Belief, translated by L. D'Isanto and D. Webb, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 1999, p. 39.

21 Ibid.

22 G. Vattimo, Jenseits der Interpretation, ibid., p. 82f.

23 G. Vattimo, Belief, ibid., p. 77.

24 Cf. ibid., p. 62f. Cf. as well U. Engel, Religion and Violence. Plea for a ‘weak’ theology in tempore belli, in: New Blackfriars 82 (2001), p. 558–560.

25 G. Vattimo, Belief, ibid., p. 63.

26 Ibid., p. 64 (with reference to Augustine, In epistulam Johannis ad Parthos, X. vii. 8).

27 G. Vattimo, The Trace of the Trace, ibid., p. 80.

28 Ibid., p. 82.

29 Ibid., p. 84.

30 Ibid., p. 86.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 M. Weiß, Die Religion der Schwäche, ibid., p. 164.

34 G. Vattimo, The Trace of the Trace, ibid., p. 88.

35 Ibid., p. 91f..

36 Cf. as well U. Engel, Philosophie (im Licht) der Inkarnation. Zu Gianni Vattimos Religionsdiskurs im Zeitalter der Interpretation, in: G. Vattimo / R. Schröder / U. Engel, Christentum im Zeitalter der Interpretation, ibid., p. 41–78, esp. 63–69. Critical of my interpretation of Vattimo: L. Oosterveen, De zwakke identiteit van het geloof. Een theologische kritik op Gianni Vattimo's interpretatie van het christendom, in: Tijdschrift voor Theologie 46 (2006), p. 333–354.

37 G. Vattimo, Belief, ibid., p. 77.

38 Cf. M. Heidegger, Nietzsches Wort „Gott ist tot“, in: Holzwege, Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann 71994, p. 209-267, here 267. – I am indebted to M. Hofer, Jenseits von Gnosis und Nihilismus, for the reference to Heidegger. Zu Vattimos Wiederentdeckung des christlichen Gottes, in: Essays zu Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, ”Religion“, ibid., p. 169-188, here 188.

39 G. Vattimo, Belief, ibid., p. 75.

40 H. Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit. Erneuerte Ausgabe, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag 62001, p. 12.

41 Ibid.

42 G. Vattimo, Belief, ibid., p. 21.

43 M. Weiß, Die Religion der Schwäche, ibid., p. 166. – Cf. Encyklica „Fides et ratio“ from Pope John Paul II. to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the relationship between faith and reason, Rome 1998, No. 91.

44 Cf. M. Weiß, Die Religion der Schwäche, ibid., p. 166.

45 G. Vattimo, Belief, ibid., p. 63.

46 Ibid., p. 78.

47 Ibid.

48 Cf. Ibid., p. 64f.: “The interpretation given by Jesus Christ of Old Testament prohetics, or (better) the interpretation which he himself is, reveals its true and only meaning: God's love for his creatures. However, this ‘ultimate’ meaning precisely by virtue of its being caritas, is not really ultimate and does not possess the peremptoriness of the metaphysical principle, which cannot transcended, and before which all questioning ceases.”

49 Ibid., p. 92.

50 Cf. F. Giacobbe, Das ”schwache Denken“ Gianni Vattimos und die Wahrheitsfrage, ibid., 129.