1 The pericope in Matthew does not refer to “strength.” There are, of course, myriad other teachings in both the Old and New Testaments concerning love. For two very diverse understandings of the relationship between love of God and neighbour, see Niebuhr, H.R., Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, 1975)Google Scholar 18ff and Karl, Rahner, “Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God,” Theological Investigations, vol. VI, trans. Karl-H, Kruger and Boniface, Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon / London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1969)Google Scholar. I have analyzed Rahner’s position in an unpublished paper entitled “Karl Rahner on the Radical Unity of The Love of God and the Love of Neighbour: Excessive Claim or Exigent Insight?’

2 There may still be other parts of the Summa that provide important insights on this topic. However, given the limited scope of this essay, I will only deal with those passages that appear to be the most salient.

3 As many scholars of Aquinas have acknowledged, his thought can be difficult to analyze and synthesize because of its sheer scope and depth. In order to reach conclusions with absolute certainty, one would have to know the entire vast body of his writings. The author of the present essay cannot pretend to have this kind of expertise. In addition, I wish to acknowledge at the outset that my own interpretation of Aquinas has been influenced by my study of Rahner’s thought. While this essay does not seek to be a comparative study, many of the questions that are raised in this essay and various perspectives pertaining to the issue at hand are indebted to Rahner.

4 All citations of Aquinas are taken from the English Dominican translation: Thomas, Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Allen, Texas: Christian Classics, 1948)Google Scholar.

5 Eberhard, Schockenhoff, “The Virtue of Charity,” Stephen, Pope, ed., The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming) 251Google Scholar.

6 I will refer to love of God and neighbour as “two loves” at times. However, this does not imply that they are envisioned here as completely distinct entities.

7 In the first case, loving these objects becomes a vehicle through which we love God. This raises the question of the instrumentalization of the neighbour, which we will address later. In the second case, our prior love for God functions as the catalyst for loving the neighbour in se. Another way to put the query is as follows: Is the unity of love of God and neighbour an ontological, normative (moral), or epistemological reality? Is it a combination of two or more of these elements? Karl Rahner discusses the issue in these terms. He states: “It is radically true, i.e. by an ontological and not merely ‘moral’ or psychological necessity, that whoever does not love the brother whom he [sic] ‘sees’, also cannot love God whom one does not see, and that one can love God whom one does not see only by loving one’s visible brother lovingly.” Karl Rahner, “Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God”. . . 247.

8 A precise and helpful treatment of Aquinas’ ambiguities on the explicit need to profess Christ in order to be saved can be found in Francis, A. Sullivan, Salvation Outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic Response (New York: Paulist Press, 1992.)Google Scholar Sullivan points out that Aquinas conceived of an implicit faith among those who came before Christ. However, Sullivan concludes that after Christ had come, and especially in his day, Aquinas believed all had the chance to hear of Christ. My remarks on Aquinas are indebted to Sullivan’s analysis.

9 Rahner appears to hold this interpretation, although he does not provide textual arguments for it. See Rahner, “Reflections on the Unity ...” 237. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II. 89. 6. According to Francis Sullivan, some modern interpreters have seen this passage as an opening in Aquinas’ thought for the salvation of those who do not explicitly profess Christ as their saviour. However, while acknowledging the possibility, Sullivan states that “it would certainly be a singular lack of consistency in the thought of St. Thomas if he allowed the possibility of justification without the explicit Christian faith which he so emphatically declared to be necessary for all in his day.” See Sullivan, Salvation Outside the Church?.. .61. My own assessment concludes that this passage does not give sufficient grounds for positing that Aquinas believed one could attain salvation without explicit belief in Christ. See especially the reply to the third objection of this question, which states that a child must “turn to God as soon as possible” (i.e. as soon as it possesses the faculty of reason) in order to be free of mortal sin through omission.

10 A thorough discussion of Aquinas’ order of charity exceeds the scope of this analysis. I wish merely to draw attention to the fact that for Aquinas loving all human beings out of charity does not require the same kind of love in deed towards all.

11 Perhaps we can understand the idea in the following way. The human yearning for union, which is a constitutive element of the human being, tends towards the transcendent God first and foremost. It is this very anthropological trait that allows us to open ourselves up to the loving of the neighbour. In other words, it is the very condition of the possibility of loving the neighbour. Yet, loving the neighbour occurs prior to our conscious, explicit knowledge of our love for God.

12 As we can ascertain from Obj.1, Aquinas reflects here on I John 4:20. According to Aquinas’ citation, we read: “He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?

13 Eberhard Schockenhoff points out that Aquinas uses the more precise formulation of “loving God in the neighbour” in De Caritate, q. un., a.4. See Schockenhoff, 252, 257, n.30. We may note that Aquinas states in II.II.44.2.Ad.2: “God is loved in the neighbour.. . .”

14 Cf. II.II.27.3.Ad.2: “Knowledge of God is acquired through other things, but once we know God we no longer know God through these things.” See also II.II.180.4. Aquinas here contends that we come to know God through God’s created goods, or other “categorical realities,” to use Rahner’s language.

15 In II.II.25.8.Ad.1, Aquinas states: “The different relations between a lover and the various things loved make a different kind of loveableness. Accordingly, since the relation between the human lover and God is different from his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away” (emphasis added).

16 Schockenhoff 252. I am indebted here to Schockenhoff for the phrase “because God is in the neighbour.”

17 See especially II.II.27.4, on loving God immediately in this life.

18 This means, for example, those who persist in charity will act in accordance with justice towards the neighbour.

19 We might ask, “Should we care for the souls of others more than are own?” This would not seem to make sense. How could one who is in the state of mortal sin help another reach union with God? Perhaps, however, one could argue that someone in mortal sin may reestablish union with God by helping another to achieve it. Yet, Aquinas seems to argue cogently when he says that we should not endanger our own union with God by committing sin to help another achieve it.

20 Schockenhoff 252.

21 What this care for the souls of others entails will, of course, vary in accordance with our relationship to them. It seems clear, however, that we are in some way to love all persons “for God’s sake,” i.e. to wish that they be one with God.

22 In II.II.44.8., Aquinas states that we should love the neighbour not for our own profit, but “in the sense of wishing [the] neighbour well,, even as.. .[we wish ourselves] well, so that [our] love for a neighbour may be a true love.. .

23 In other words, Aquinas does not seem to contend that every time we do something good for another we must be consciously motivated by the desire to love God. Yet, even if we were, charity requires that our love for the neighbour care is real. In other words, we must treat our neighbours as human beings, not as mere stepping-stones on the way to union with God. Treating the neighbour this way neither achieves love of the neighbour, nor does it achieve love of God. On this issue, see also II.II.30.4 regarding mercy, especially Ad. 1 and Ad.2.

24 Simon, Tugwell, “Introduction,” Simon, Tugwell, ed., Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1988) 284Google Scholar. Tugwell contends that Aquinas makes this clear in II.II.182.4. We will analyze that text momentarily.

25 Tugwell notes that regarding Aquinas that it “is far from clear that he has seriously committed himself to this answer,” namely that the contemplative life is superior to the active life. In his judgment, Aquinas was simply not “interested enough” to work through the implications of his basic premise. See Tugwell, 282-283. Thomas Merton also deals with Aquinas’ qualifications in an intriguing and helpful manner. See the epilogue in Thomas, Merton, The Seven Storey Mountain (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990)Google Scholar.

26 In my judgment, this claim makes the statement about charity seem enigmatic. The logic of it is clear enough; chastity “curbs the impetuosity of the passions, and quell[s] the disturbance of outward occupations” (cf.II.II.180.2). However, we may ask if this negative element of restraint suffices to prepare one for contemplative life. I am arguing that Aquinas implies elsewhere that this is not the case.

27 For the sake of clarity, we reiterate that this presumes “faith” as Aquinas defines it. In other words, this is not akin to Rahner’s “anonymous Christianity.”

28 World hunger, poverty, AIDS, the threat of nuclear war all contribute to the enormous amount of need in our world. I wish to acknowledge that this section of the present essay moves beyond Aquinas’ own contentions to an interpretation that may be somewhat tenuous. In my judgment, this interpretation would at least be valid for contemporary Christians.

29 Aquinas states the same idea in II.II.182.1. Rather than citing Augustine as in the above passage, he quotes Aristotle, who says “it is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich ... .” Tugwell demonstrates that Aquinas was willing to say that “contemplatives” love God less than “actives.” See Tugwell 282.

30 The likelihood of the conscious, explicit reduction of religion to ethics in Aquinas day was probably small. However, many may have been tempted to forget about the life of prayer and contemplation indeliberately in order to perform “good works.” The fact that the discussion reaches back to the very origins of Christianity attests to this fact. We find it in The Gospel of Luke in the story of Mary and Martha (cf. Lk 10).

31 Aquinas unfortunately does not elaborate on how this may be the case.

32 Tugwell argues that Aquinas unfortunately operated with an impoverished notion of prayer in his treatise on the contemplative life in the Summa. Tugwell, 283. An exploration of Aquinas’ understanding of prayer exceeds the scope of the present essay. Tugwell’s essay provides a detailed analysis of this issue. Aquinas’ remark on prayer here seems all the more bizarre in light of a statement he makes on worship of God: “We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts not for his own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbour. For he needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbour.” See II.II.31.4.Ad. 1.

33 In this regard, I would argue that much more convergence between Aquinas and Rahner exists than at first glance. Aquinas, does not, of course, draw the radical conclusion that Rahner does, namely that every act of explicitly loving God is also formally love the neighbour. Cf. Rahner, “Reflections on the Unity ...” 237. I have attempted to explain Rahner’s claim in detail in my above-cited essay.

34 I am indebted to William Spohn for this term. See William C. Spohn, Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics (New York: Continuum, 1999).

35 In a lengthier essay, I would elaborate on why I believe this is an urgent issue for Christians, and people in general, today. I have presented such an argument in my above-cited essay on Rahner.