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Lonergan and Hume IV: Critique of Religion (2)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
Extract
The argument adduced for the existence of God arrives by a chain of reasoning at the affirmation of a being that is self-explanatory, an uncaused cause, at what is sometimes also called a ‘necessary being’. The notion of a necessary being is one that Hume, in arguments not so far outlined, finds incoherent, and he has been followed in this by a good many other philosophers. The argument for a necessary being is presented by Demea:
Whatever exists must have a cause or reason for its existence, it being absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself or to be the cause of its own existence.
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- Copyright © 1982 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
1 See Hick, op. cit. p 170
2 T. Penelhum, op. cit. p 170
3 Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Selby‐Bigge, , Oxford. 1902, P125Google Scholar
4 Ibid. p 128
5 Ibid. p25
6 David Hume and the Miraculous, Taylor, A. E., Cambridge, 1927, p 44Google Scholar
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