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The Interaction of Philosophy and Theology in Aquinas's Christology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
Aquinas accepts the harmony of faith and reason, but he does not think that such harmony is always easily arrived at. After making some background points about his views on faith, reason, philosophy, and theology, I explore two cases drawn from his Christology. In the first, philosophical thinking influences how we understand revelation; in the second, theological thinking influences how we understand a topic normally thought of as part of philosophy. In both cases, harmony is not pre-given but instead arrived at only through a process of adjustment.
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- Copyright © 2022 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
1 For a discussion of Aquinas's views, primarily as found in the Summa contra gentiles, see Konyndyk, Kenneth J., ‘Aquinas on Faith and Science’, Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 12, no. 1 (1995): 3–21 at 8-14Google Scholar.
2 ST I, q. 32, art. 1.
3 ST II-II, q. 2, art. 10; cf. SCG I, c. 8.
4 See, again, ST I, q. 32, art. 1.
5 ST I, q. 1, art. 1; cf. SCG I, cc. 4-5. For discussion of how Aquinas sees faith as protecting human thought from error, see George, Marie I., ‘“Trust Me.” “Why Should I?” Aquinas on Faith and Reason’, in The Ever-Illuminating Wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas: Papers Presented at a Conference Sponsored by the Wethersfield Institute, New York City, October 14, 1994, vol. 8, The Proceedings of the Wethersfield Institute (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), pp. 31-58, at 46-52Google Scholar. For discussion of how Aquinas sees faith as giving us access to something inaccessible to natural reason, with special emphasis on how this fits into Aquinas's understanding of human action, see Niederbacher, Bruno, Glaube als Tugend bei Thomas von Aquin: erkenntnistheoretische und religionsphilosophische Interpretationen, Münchener philosophische Studien, N.F., 24 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004), pp. 34-42Google Scholar.
6 ST II-II, q. 1, art. 4-5. For discussion of a wide range of historical views, see Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, The Theological Virtues I: On Faith, trans. Thomas a Reilly, Kempis (St. Louis and London: Herder, 1965), pp. 109-121Google Scholar.
7 For another example: Ja 1.17 says that in God there is no variation or shadow due to change, and yet Scripture often enough presents God as changing his plans.
8 ST II-II, q. 1, art. 4, ad 3. For a distinct but related point, see ST II-II q. 8, art. 4.
9 I am following the reading found in the Ottawa edition, which follows the Leonine at this point.
10 See Aquinas, In Boethius de Trin., q. 2, art. 3.
11 Hence by ‘impassible’ I mean not only, or even primarily, the inability to experience emotions.
12 For more on the above, see Gorman, Michael, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 53-72Google Scholar.
13 When applying such concepts to divine persons, care is needed. As Aquinas explains at ST I, q. 29, art. 3, obj. 4 and ad 4, God is ‘rational’ only in the generic sense of being intelligent; if by ‘rational’ we mean, more specifically, having the capacity to move discursively from one thought to another, then ‘rationality’ should be denied of God.
14 This language suggests the esse secondarium solution found in De unione but not so often in ST III. See Gorman, Michael, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 101-125Google Scholar.
15 For more on all of this, see Gorman, Michael, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 73-100Google Scholar.
16 For discussion of certain aspects of this problem, see Gorman, Michael, ‘On the Ontological Status of Features’, in Irwin, William and Sanford, Jonathan J., eds., The Philosophical Legacy of Jorge J.E. Gracia (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022), pp. 133-142Google Scholar.
17 See Gorman, Michael, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 24Google Scholar.
18 Another example would be the claim that no human in his earthly life can have the beatific vision, a claim to which Christ turns out to be an exception: see ST III, q. 10.
19 This paper grows out of talk given in June 2022 at Blackfriars Hall, Oxford University, as part of both the Aquinas Institute's Emerging Scholars Workshop and Blackfriars Hall's Aquinas Seminar. I am grateful to participants for their helpful feedback. I am particularly grateful to Liam McDonnell for a subsequent correspondence that enabled me to get clearer on a number of important points. I am also grateful to Anne-Marie Gorman for detailed criticism of the penultimate draft.