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Abstract
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Since the term ‘Ideology’ and ‘Ideological’ are used in a variety of ways, I shall start by saying something about how I intend to use these terms in this paper and indicate what I understand to be the nature of my remarks about them.
For the purposes of this paper I shall take Marxism, Conservatism, Liberalism and Nationalism to be examples of political ideologies. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list; I could, for example, have included Fascism or National Socialism. It is merely intended to provide me with enough material to make the main points of this paper without becoming too involved in matters of exegesis. It should also be noted that in calling Marxism, Liberalism and the rest ideologies I am not using the term in a pejorative manner. That is, I wish to distinguish at the outset between my thesis and that of those who would argue that in calling a belief, doctrine or argument ideological, we are also condemning it as unreasonable or irrational. My aim is simply to discuss how we can best characterise ideological arguments, by comparing and contrasting them with other kinds of arguments. That said, it ought to be clear that my remarks will be philosophical rather than historical in nature. Though I shall be referring to disputes between ideologists that took place in the past, my interest in them will not be that of the historian. I shall be concerned with their conceptual structure rather than their chronological development.
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- Copyright © 1982 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
1 R M Gunn and D Hoffman, ‘Is Nature Dialectical?’Marxism Today, January and February 1977.
2 Egner, G, Birth Regulation and Catholic Belief. Sheed & Ward, London 1966Google Scholar.
3 Cf Wittgenstein, L, Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961Google Scholar, 5.552
4 This is not quite true. One difference would be that learning more about Marxism would help to elucidate what was meant by ‘class struggle’, whereas learning more about science would not involve the same elucidation of causality.
5 Kovesi, J, Moral Notions, London, 1967, Routledge & Kegan PaulGoogle Scholar.
6 In Phillips, D Z & Mounce, H O, Moral Practices, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969Google Scholar. I am indebted to that book for much of the argument in the next three paragraphs. I do not, of course, claim the approval of either author for my use of their arguments.
7 The person who tries to excuse a moral failing or an evil action on the grounds “It was a mistake” is surely not meeting the criticism that is being made, e.g. Nixon and his handling of Watergate.
8 Any argument to show that democracy (or the lack of it) had brought progress is likely to be circular here, since a progressive society is defined by Mill as one which is democratic and vice versa in the case of Maine.
9 SirMaine, Henry, Representative Government, London, 1886, p 63Google Scholar.
10 This analogy is used by D Z Phillips in the context of contrasting religious belief and science. Again, 1 do not claim his authority for my use of his example.
11 Wittgenstein, L, Lectures on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, Ed Barratt, C, Oxford, Blackwell, 1966, p 55Google Scholar.
12 Wittgenstein, L, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6. 43.Google Scholar
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